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ON THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
MEDICAID AND CHARITY CARE
MERLE LENIHAN* & LAURA D. HERMER**
INTRODUCTION
Ethel Hines lost her health insurance when she divorced.  She was
admitted to a hospital in Ohio where the doctors discovered she
needed a pacemaker, which was placed in her heart.   After struggling
to pay off as much of the bill as she could, the hospital and her physi-
cian “excused” the remaining balance.  Ethel paid the doctor’s fees for
monthly checkups out of pocket until she moved to Tennessee.  Now
working as a newspaper delivery carrier and still uninsured, she went to
a free clinic after over four years with no checkups.  The doctors there
noticed a skin problem on her face.  It turned out to be skin cancer but
she was eligible for TennCare, Tennessee’s Medicaid program, so she
was treated for cancer and started getting checkups for her pacemaker
again.1
Ginny was five years old when she “met” her doctor on his first
night as a pediatric cardiology fellow at a Virginia hospital.  She had just
gotten out of surgery to repair a congenital heart defect when her heart
stopped and Dr. Garson revived her.  Over the next several years Ginny
did “beautifully.” When she was sixteen, Ginny developed a serious
heart rhythm problem that, after trying several medications, was con-
trolled by an expensive one.  The treatment kept her from developing a
fatal rhythm and she did remarkably well.  After high school Ginny
applied for every possible job in her small town but no one would hire
her, perhaps because she so willingly and proudly told potential
employers about her heart condition.  Then, a few months after Ginny
turned nineteen, she died suddenly one night.  The cause was a fatal
heart rhythm.  Lying in a drawer beside her bed was an empty pill bot-
tle.  Ginny had “aged out” of Medicaid and, knowing her parents could
not afford the medication, she stopped taking it.2
Keeshun Lurk was twenty years old and working part-time at Wash-
ington Hospital Center in the nation’s capital when he developed
* M.D., University of Tennessee Health Science Center; Ph.D., Institute for the
Medical Humanities, University of Texas Medical Branch.  I would like to thank the mem-
bers of my dissertation committee, especially Professor Hermer, for her encouragement
and support as well as her attention to detail and for pressing me, when necessary, to
shore up my arguments. This Article is substantially based on one chapter of my
dissertation.
** Associate Professor, Hamline University School of Law.  J.D., Northeastern Uni-
versity School of Law; L.L.M., Health Law, University of Houston Law Center.
1. ED KASHI  & JULIE WINOKUR, DENIED: THE CRISIS OF AMERICA’S UNINSURED 35
(2003).
2. Arthur Garson, Heart of the Uninsured, 26 HEALTH AFF. 227 (2007).
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debilitating headaches.  Because he was a temporary worker, he was not
offered health insurance.  He went to the hospital’s emergency depart-
ment where he was diagnosed with migraines and an ear infection,
which presumably was causing a lump on his neck.  When his symptoms
worsened, he became completely unable to work.  He went to the Wash-
ington Free Clinic where they confirmed that Keeshun needed a biopsy
of the lump that had not gone away.  Their clinic used a network of
volunteer providers and one agreed to do a biopsy.  The lump was
caused by brain cancer.  Keeshun started receiving cancer treatment
about a year after his symptoms began, though he did not know how he
would pay for it.  When his unemployment benefits ran out, he became
eligible for Medicaid, which covered the cost of his treatment from that
point.  His medical debt, however, remained intact.3
The stories of these patients show some of the ways in which Medi-
caid, hospital charity care, free clinics, physician volunteers, and delay-
ing or forgoing medical care interact in the lives of people who are ill
and have a low income.  Medicaid, when it was enacted, was arguably
intended to bring qualifying members of the poor, who often relied on
charity and public clinics for medical care, into the health care “main-
stream” by providing them with a source of third party reimbursement.4
Yet contrary to that intent, Medicaid may be seen as charity care to
institutional and individual health care providers when costs for treat-
ing Medicaid patients exceed payment, or when payment otherwise fails
to meet health care providers’ expectations concerning remuneration.5
People with a low income who are uninsured may visit a free clinic or
receive charity or discounted care from hospitals or physicians and
sometimes, because of their illnesses, either become eligible or find
they are eligible for Medicaid.  Historically, Medicaid has been linked
to certain categories of low-income people, particularly people receiv-
ing cash welfare.6  A lengthy history accounts for this connection, and
despite attempts to delink Medicaid from welfare, if not charity, the
association continues to this day.7
The connection between Medicaid and charity continues in other
guises.  Beginning in the 1980s, Medicaid became one of the most
important sources of funding for hospitals that provide care not only to
low-income Medicaid enrollees, but also to uninsured people with no
direct connection to Medicaid whatsoever.8  Medicaid payments also
support other safety net providers such as community health centers
that provide primary care to uninsured people.9  In many instances at
3. Trudy Lieberman, Second-Class, 65 CONSUMER REP., Sept. 2000, at 42.
4. See infra notes 274–276 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 48-50, 52-57 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text; see also infra note 19 (discussing the
language in Paul Ryan’s proposed budget).
7. See infra notes 95–111 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 132–133,136 and accompanying text.
9. Medicaid is the largest source of revenue for community health centers, provid-
ing nearly 40% of their total revenue, and Medicaid payments to community health cen-
ters are higher than at other sites because they are prospective cost-based. About 75% of
health center patients are uninsured or enrolled in Medicaid. See, e.g., KAISER COMM’N ON
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the state level, Medicaid and charity are closely intertwined in policy
decisions.10  The Affordable Care Act (ACA) promised to substantially
reduce the categorical nature of the program by expanding access to all
individuals earning up to 133% of the federal poverty level, but the
2012 Supreme Court ruling allows states the option not to implement
Medicaid expansion.11
This Article explores these aspects of Medicaid.  It focuses on the
uneasy relationship between Medicaid and charity care.  This relation-
ship becomes particularly acute in the context of Medicaid reimburse-
ment.  In this Article, we trace some of the history of the Medicaid
program, using Medicaid reimbursement and supplemental payments
as lenses through which to examine the relationship between Medicaid
and charity care.  The tension that we will uncover will need to be
resolved if Medicaid is to come closer to achieving its arguable aim of
placing the poor on the same footing in our health care system as
enjoyed by wealthier, privately-insured Americans.  In Part I, we trace
the origins of Medicaid in charity care and the impact of this origin as
Medicaid developed in the United States.  In Part II, we examine the
creation and evolution of Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital
(DSH) funding and Upper Payment Level (UPL) programs, with a par-
ticular focus on how the construction of the two supplemental payment
programs encourages, or at least permits, abuse by both states and hos-
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS IN AN ERA OF HEALTH REFORM:
AN OVERVIEW AND KEY CHALLENGES TO HEALTH CENTER GROWTH, 2, 4 (2013), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8098-03.pdf
10. At least two recent analyses have assessed the effects of states’ decisions to
expand Medicaid on hospital “uncompensated care.” See, e.g., John A. Graves, Medicaid
Expansion Opt-Outs and Uncompensated Care, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2365–67 (2012); STAN
DORN ET AL., THE FINANCIAL BENEFIT TO HOSPITALS FROM STATE EXPANSION OF MEDICAID
(2013), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2013/
rwjf405040; see also infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.  It is relevant here that
“uncompensated care” is not equivalent to charity care and both terms have a variety of
meanings.  In general, uncompensated care is comprised of charity care for which no
payment is expected because of financial inability to pay, and bad debt, for which a pay-
ment is expected. See, e.g., AM. HOSP. ASS’N, UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE COST FACT
SHEET (2013), available at http://www.aha.org/content/13/1-2013-uncompensated-care-
fs.pdf.  This fact sheet reports that 5.8% of hospital expenses in 2010 were categorized as
uncompensated care.  The AHA does not report charity and bad debt separately.  Bad
debt expense is generally much greater than charity expense.  For example, in the most
recent analysis of data on nonprofit hospitals, 1.9% of expenses in 2009 were reported as
charity care. See Gary J. Young et al., Provision of Community Benefits by Tax-Exempt U.S.
Hospitals, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1522 (2013).  The definition of uncompensated care in
the Medicaid DSH program is defined differently from the AHA definition. See infra note
223 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 14.  Rosenbaum and Westmoreland point out that:
[F]or the poor and near-poor, the Affordable Care Act’s central achievement
was the extension of Medicaid to all nonelderly low-income people who were
previously ineligible for coverage.  In the case of adults, as already has been
accomplished for children and pregnant women, the expansion essentially ren-
ders irrelevant the demographic, financial, and personal factors that are the ves-
tiges of cash welfare assistance.
Sara Rosenbaum & Timothy M. Westmoreland, The Supreme Court’s Surprising Decision on
the Medicaid Expansion: How Will the Federal Government and States Proceed? 31 HEALTH AFF.
1665 (2012).
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pitals and encourages the continued association and conflation of
Medicaid with charity care.  In Part III, we examine the state DSH
reporting and auditing requirements, which recently went into effect,
as well as the changes to DSH enacted in the ACA.  We conclude that, if
Medicaid DSH and UPL payments are to be retained, additional work
must be done to ensure that the ultimate fate of Medicaid supplemen-
tal funding, once it gets to the states, is transparent, and that it is used
to expand access for the underserved in a more logical, efficient, and
productive manner.  Changes to DSH funding in the ACA provide an
opportunity to do some of this work.
I. THE ORIGINS OF MEDICAID AND LINKS TO CHARITY
Medicaid is a means-tested, joint federal-state entitlement program
for certain low-income people that finances the delivery of primary and
acute medical services as well as long-term care.  In 2010, Medicaid
financed health and long-term care services to more than 68 million
people.12  Medicaid provides benefits to more people than any other
public or private insurance program, including Medicare.13  Under the
ACA, Medicaid will expand substantially. While originally mandatory,
the Supreme Court’s ruling in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius effectively makes the expansion optional for states by remov-
ing Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) authority to with-
hold existing Medicaid funding as a measure to incentivize states to
expand Medicaid.14  Nevertheless, the Congressional Budget Office
estimated after the Supreme Court’s ruling that 11 million additional
previously-uninsured individuals will have coverage through Medicaid
by 2022.15
The importance of Medicaid cannot be overstated as a critical
source of health insurance coverage for children, disabled people,
residents of nursing homes, and other groups.16  As the ACA is imple-
12. ELICIA J.  HERZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33202, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 13
(2010), available at http://www.aging.senate.gov/crs/medicaid1.pdf.
13. In 2010, Medicare provided health insurance coverage to 47 million people.
Although Medicaid covers more people than Medicare, it costs less. In 2010, spending on
the Medicare program accounted for 12% of the federal budget whereas spending on
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance (CHIP) combined accounted for 8%. See,
e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: A PRIMER, 1, 15 (2010), available at http://
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7615-03.pdf.
14. Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
15. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION,
(2012), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43472.  Estimates of the number of Medicaid
enrollees vary widely, however.  This is due to the methods used to make the estimates
and to the uncertainty of the policies that will be put in place to either encourage or
discourage enrollment. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Policy Makers Should Prepare
for Major Uncertainties in Medicaid Enrollment, Costs, and Needs for Physicians under Health
Reform, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2186 (2011).
16. See, e.g., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER
KEY INFORMATION ON THE NATION’S HEALTH COVERAGE PROGRAM FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE
(2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/7334-05.
pdf.
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mented, the program is poised to play an even more important role in
essential health care coverage.17  Yet its roots in public assistance that
began in the early twentieth century have meant that it continues to be
associated with a pejorative notion of “welfare.” The journalist Niall Fer-
guson recently claimed that “[n]early 110 million individuals received a
welfare benefit in 2011, mostly Medicaid or food stamps.”18  As he sees
it, the people receiving these benefits are a drain on the country.  He is
not alone in expressing this sentiment.19
The origins of Medicaid can be traced to the “outdoor relief” of
the American colonies, modeled after practices established in England.
“Outdoor relief” referred to charity provided to indigent individuals
and families without the requirement for recipients to live and work in
an almshouse.  During the colonial period, it was seen both as a public
responsibility and a profoundly local practice to provide this “charity”
or relief to the poor.20 Taxes for poor relief were often collected sepa-
rately, emphasizing the expense and enhancing resentment.21  Propo-
nents of outdoor relief often believed a small sum of money could tide
over a distressed family and keep them together, whereas proponents of
the almshouse or institutionalized care were not convinced that keep-
ing poor families together was wise or that such a system could be pro-
tected from abuse.22  The alleged effects of outdoor relief included
“[t]he demoralization of the poor through the erosion of indepen-
dence and self-respect; the spread of idleness and the loss of the will to
work; the promotion of immorality in all its ugly forms; and the
increase in public costs through the growth of poorhouses and jails.”23
Similar sentiments persist today.24
17. Id. at 34.
18. Niall Ferguson, Why Obama Must Go, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2012, at 22.
19. As just one example, Congressman Paul Ryan compared his 2012 proposal to
cut Medicaid payments by 75% by 2050 and block grant the program to the block-grant-
ing of and removal of entitlement status from cash welfare in 1996.  Julian Pequet, Point-
ing to ‘90s Welfare Reforms, Paul Ryan Defends His Medicaid Plan, THE HILL (Apr. 17 2012),
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/medicaid/221943-lawmakers-spar-over-welfare-
reforms-lessons-for-medicaid-overhaul.  However, a recent Kaiser/Harvard survey found
that a majority of Americans support the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of Medicaid,
and nearly half support no cuts for Medicaid in addressing national deficit reduction.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH CARE AGENDA FOR THE 113TH CONGRESS 2, 4
(2013), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8405-F.pdf.
20. MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 14–15 (1996).
21. Id. at 17.  From the earliest times, there has been a seemingly contradictory
sense of charity.  For instance, to what extent can taxes collected by local or other govern-
ments be considered charity? Taxes to support public education, police, and fire services
are virtually never considered charity. Taxes that support services only or primarily for
poor people, on the other hand, are almost always associated with charity by some.
22. Id. at 55–59.
23. Id. at 41–42.
24. See, e.g., Laura D. Hermer, Personal Responsibility: A Plausible Social Goal, but Not
for Medicaid Reform, 38 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16 (May–June, 2008) (describing how, espe-
cially recently, paternalistic requirements in state Medicaid programs such as higher
copayments and enhanced benefits for maintaining wellness metrics are often framed as
fostering greater personal responsibility but that these are rooted in moralistic attitudes
toward the poor).
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By the early twentieth century, worry that providing relief to desti-
tute people would promote idleness and the loss of morality was over-
come for certain deserving groups, especially widows with children.  For
example, “mothers’ pensions” were a “small, halting but consequential
step away from charity and toward entitlement.”25  Thirty-nine states
had enacted mothers’ pension laws by 1919.26  After the economic dev-
astation caused by the Great Depression, the number of Americans sur-
viving on some form of relief reached 40% in some states.  Social
insurance of some form, as had already been enacted in all of the coun-
tries of continental Europe, seemed inevitable as economic instability
was seen as a result of forces beyond the individual’s control.27
Acknowledgment that the federal government bears some respon-
sibility for the economic well-being of its citizens occurred when Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act in 1935.  It was
the “seminal event in the creation of entitlements in the United
States.”28  The Social Security Act was an omnibus measure that
included not only the Old Age Insurance program (now Old Age, Survi-
vors, and Disability Insurance, otherwise known as Social Security), but
also the Old Age Assistance program, Aid to the Blind, unemployment
insurance, and Aid to Dependent Children (“ADC”).29  ADC was
modeled directly after the mothers’ pensions laws. ADC and other
means-tested programs became known as “welfare.”30  Michael Katz
observed that by the 1960s,
“welfare” had become a code word for public assistance given
mainly to unmarried mothers, mostly young women of color,
under Aid to Families with Dependent Children [the successor to
ADC].  No other public benefits carried the stigma of welfare.
The political left, right, and center all attacked it.  In the early
1990’s, when President Bill Clinton promised to “end welfare as
we know it,” everyone knew that he meant AFDC—the most dis-
liked public program in America.31
Despite the clear improvements that many Americans could claim
regarding financial security and other benefits, in some respects, the
Social Security Act set up a clear division between social insurance and
public assistance.  This became apparent, for example, in the role that
25. KATZ, supra note 20, at 133.
26. MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 197 (1996).
27. WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
WELFARE IN AMERICA 273–75 (1999).
28. TIMOTHY S. JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-
CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 74 (2003).
29. ADC was the forerunner to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and, later, Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF).  In 1962, ADC was renamed AFDC.
In 1996, AFDC was replaced with TANF. DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID
POLITICS AND POLICY 1965–2007 13, 245–46 (2008).
30. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE, 1890–1935, at 253–60 (1994).
31. MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE
STATE 1 (2001).
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discretion played in program procedures.  Social Security criteria for
eligibility were elaborately detailed, leaving little to bureaucrats’ discre-
tion.  Discretion in the provision of ADC benefits, however, often
involved intrusive, personal monitoring and judging of the trustworthi-
ness and character of those receiving benefits.32  ADC clients were
required to be “needy,” which resulted in constant surveillance by
caseworkers who determined not only whether there was a need but
also the amount of the need.33  In essence, and in contrast to social
insurance, there was “administrative discretion at the lowest levels of
government.”34
A. The Kerr-Mills Act Creates Medical Vendor Payments for ADC Recipients
The first suggestion of an entitlement to health care among ADC
recipients came in the form of amendments to the Social Security Act
in 1950.  These amendments provided for federal matching funds to
states for the purpose of paying medical vendors for health services for
people receiving public assistance.35  By 1960, spending on medical
care through public assistance programs climbed to more than half a
billion dollars and forty states were participating—albeit to vastly differ-
ing degrees—in a federally-approved vendor payment plan. The Kerr-
Mills Act of 1960 used a similar framework to provide what was sup-
posed to be comprehensive medical benefits to people receiving Old
Age Assistance.36
The Kerr-Mills provisions were implemented slowly and many
states did not participate, or participated only minimally.  It was diffi-
cult to know how many additional people were covered by Kerr-Mills
since states sometimes merely transferred the cost of care under less
generous vendor payments to the program.37  A particularly humiliat-
ing experience for elderly Kerr-Mills recipients was the requirement to
provide their children’s addresses, each of whom was subject to a
means-test.38  Hospitals were distressed at the delay between the provi-
sion of care and receipt of payment for Kerr-Mills patients.  The result,
according to Jonathan Engel, was that “Kerr-Mills patients began to be
32. Particularly during the 1940s and 1950s, ADC clients were subjected to frequent
monitoring by caseworkers who would search for hidden resources and deduct any earn-
ings that were found from the ADC stipends.  Far more intrusive and moralistic was the
practice of monitoring for a “suitable home.”  The presence of a man in the house, some-
times discovered through surprise raids, or the birth of an illegitimate child, made the
home unsuitable and therefore not eligible for benefits. Id. at 298–99.  Administratively,
this process was called “deeming” by the caseworker.  In 1958, the Supreme Court ruled
in King v. Smith that such restrictions violated the Social Security Act.  King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1958).
33. GORDON, supra note 30, at 293–99.
34. ROBERT B. STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE
STUDY OF MEDICAID 11 (2d ed. 2003).
35. Social Security Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81–734, 64 Stat. 551.
36. JOST, supra note 28, at 80.
37. Id. at 80–81.
38. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 34, at 35.
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seen as glorified charity patients rather than private paying patients
with government-subsidized insurance policies.”39
B. The Enactment of Title XIX
When Congress took up the issue of health care for the elderly
again in the mid-1960s, it ultimately enacted the social insurance pro-
gram of Medicare, rather than a means-tested program.  Medicaid, Title
XIX of the Social Security Act, was enacted as a means-tested compan-
ion program to Medicare for the “deserving” poor.40  In structure,
Medicaid descended directly from Kerr-Mills.  Like Kerr-Mills, federal
funding for Medicaid was open-ended for enrollees who met both cate-
gorical and financial requirements.  States have the rate of their match-
ing funds determined yearly as in Kerr-Mills, based on the relative per
capita income of the state.41  States’ participation has always been vol-
untary, but states choosing to participate must meet federal baseline
requirements.  States were required to include people enrolled in the
federal public assistance programs, such as AFDC-eligible children and
adults, the blind, and the disabled, rather than merely the elderly as in
Kerr-Mills.  Given the program’s tight connection to public assistance,
administering Medicaid was most often a responsibility of the states’
welfare department.42
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) had
the task of implementing both Medicare and Medicaid, even though
Medicaid was ultimately a state-administered program.43 The federal
response was hampered by the lack of clarity on the goals of Medicaid:
Was Medicaid primarily a “health” or a “welfare” program?44  Historical
precedence conflicted with aspirations of proponents: “Many in 1965
assumed that Medicaid would provide the basis for widespread health
care for the poor, yet its historical evolution pointed clearly to the nar-
rower welfare mold.”45  Medicaid was not a program based on medical
need at its inception; it was a program based on categories linked to
public assistance.  Congress furthered the dichotomy and confusion by
naming patients “beneficiaries” under Medicare and “recipients” under
39. JONATHAN ENGEL, POOR PEOPLE’S MEDICINE: MEDICAID AND AMERICAN CHARITY
CARE SINCE 1965, at 37 (2006).
40. JOST, supra note 28, at 98. Jost describes the defining characteristics of social
insurance entitlements as: eligibility requirements defined by federal law, entitlement is
linked to contributions, and administrative review is available. Id at 75. See also JONATHAN
OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE, AMERICAN POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECON-
OMY 28–31 (2003).
41. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–97, 79 Stat. 286, 351. The
federal government funded about 57% of Medicaid spending overall in recent years with
a range between 50-73% per state. See also KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNIN-
SURED, supra note 16, at 31.
42. Judith D. Moore & David G. Smith, Legislating Medicaid: Considering Medicaid and
Its Origins, 27 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 45 (2005), available at http://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/HealthCareFinancingReview/downloads/
05-06Winpg45.pdf.
43. HEW was the forerunner of the Department of Health and Human Services.
44. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 34, at xx.
45. Id. at 77.
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Medicaid.46 From the beginning, as the social historian Rosemary Ste-
vens wrote in 1974, there was lack of clarity: “Recipients have never
been clear about their ‘rights;’ providers have not been clear whether
they are to treat Medicaid patients as ‘real’ patients or charity cases.”47
C. Provider Participation in Medicaid
One of the pervasive problems in the Medicaid program has been
its comparatively low payment rates, particularly for physicians.  In most
states, Medicaid physician reimbursement is much lower than Medicare
or private health insurance, and has been so for much of the program’s
history.48  A 1967 editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine makes
this point:
The welfare directors seeking cut-rate payments to physicians
under Medicaid are virtually demanding that physicians subsidize
the Government – a Government that has assumed the responsi-
bility of paying for medical services to a large segment of the pop-
ulation.  The traditional ethical principle that physicians should
treat patients in need of medical care without regard to their abil-
ity to pay is noble in concept and practice.  Once, however, the
patient becomes the beneficiary of a federal or state program that
guarantees that he will receive high-quality medical care, and that
it will be paid for, he cannot justifiably be classed as a medical
charity case.  The concept of the federal Government as a charity
case is ridiculous.49
Hospital reimbursement was different.  While, according to Rose-
mary Stevens, states “could include the continuation of the long welfare
tradition of reimbursing [physician services] at less than cost, in other
words, expecting providers to donate out of charity,” Medicaid hospital
payments were originally based on “reasonable cost,” as in the Medicare
program—in other words, “paying the full costs at which each hospital
delivers services to Medicaid recipients.”50 The provision of hospital
care to poor patients on the basis of reasonable cost was not entirely
hailed as an achievement.  Medical educators sometimes considered
the treatment of Medicaid patients as private patients to be a conun-
drum.  A former president of the American Hospital Association wor-
ried in 1966 about “the clear probability of the disappearance of the
‘ward service’ patient—the ‘charity patient’—the ‘second class’
patient—upon whom has rested nearly the whole reliance for graduate
46. ENGEL, supra note 39, at 49.
47. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 34, at 356–57.
48. See generally State Health Facts, Medicaid-to-Medicare Fee Index, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. available at http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-to-medicare-fee-
index/.  Stephen Zuckerman et al., Trends in Medicaid Physician Fees, 2003–2008, 28
HEALTH AFF. (2009).
49. Editorial, Resistance to Change under Medicaid, 277 NEW ENG. J. MED. 765 (1967).
50. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 34, at 66; see also RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & JOHN
HOLAHAN, MEDICAID IN THE REAGAN ERA: FEDERAL POLICY AND STATE CHOICES 38 (1982)
(arguing that another method, state “rate-setting,” or prospective payment, was occasion-
ally used as an alternative to the reasonable cost method).
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medical education and a major part of undergraduate medical
education’”51
Hospital payment requirements for Medicaid patients changed in
1981 under an expansion of the Boren Amendment, which allowed
states to pay an amount “reasonable and adequate to meet the costs
that must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated institu-
tions.”52  The result was that while forty states paid for Medicaid hospi-
tal services on the basis of Medicare rates in 1981, only four states did so
by 1991.53  The trend in hospital payments under Medicaid and Medi-
care have nevertheless converged as of 2010, with the American Hospi-
tal Association reporting that both programs’ payments covered just
over 92% of costs.54  Medicaid physician fees, on the other hand, con-
tinue to lag significantly behind Medicare fees.  In 2008, Medicaid phy-
sician fees were 72% of Medicare fees.55  Among payments for specific
services, Medicaid fees vary such that, on average, Medicaid pays 66% of
Medicare fees for primary care services but 93% of obstetrical fees.56
These averages smooth over substantial disparities among states.  Medi-
caid fees vary among states such that, for example, Wyoming reim-
burses physicians for Medicaid services an average of 40% more than
they receive under Medicare, whereas New York reimburses physicians,
on average, more than 40% less than Medicare rates.57
Low physicians’ fees are usually cited as the most important reason
for low physician participation in the Medicaid program.  About half of
physicians nationwide accept all new Medicaid patients whereas more
than 70% accept all new commercially insured or Medicare patients.
Other reasons for low physician participation in Medicaid are delays in
payment and high administrative burdens.58  In older research, the atti-
tudes and perceptions of providers have been shown to be a factor in
Medicaid participation. For example, in the 1983 President’s Commis-
sion Report on access to care, the authors included research demon-
strating that additional contributing factors to low participation
included physicians’ personal dislike for Medicaid patients and political
51. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 34, at 99.
52. JOST, supra note 28, at 167.  The Boren Amendment was repealed in 1997 after
many “Boren lawsuits” had resulted in states being forced to increase their payment rates
to hospitals and nursing homes when they were found not to be “reasonable and ade-
quate.” LAURA KATZ OLSON, THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID 60–61 (2010).  When the Boren
Amendment was repealed, the Medicaid DSH requirement, discussed subsequently, was
retained. CHARLES LUBAND, RR. MEDICAID SUPPLEMENTAL PAYMENTS AND FINANCING ISSUES
2, (2011), available at http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Docu-
ments/MM09/luband.pdf.
53. ENGEL, supra note 39, at 169.
54. In 2010, the payment to cost ratio for Medicare was 92.4%, for Medicaid 92.8%,
and for commercial insurers 133.5%. See Trendwatch Chartbook 2011 Table 4.4, AM. HOSP.
ASS’N, http://www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/chartbook/2012/table4-4.pdf.
55. Zuckerman, supra note 48, at w510, w515.
56. Id at w515.
57. Id at w513–w14.
58. Peter J. Cunningham & Ann S. O’Malley, Do Reimbursement Delays Discourage
Medicaid Participation by Physicians?, 28 HEALTH AFF. w17, w18 (2008).
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attitudes against the involvement of “government in medicine.”59  A let-
ter from a Baltimore physician in 1982 described his experience with
Medicaid patients in a nuanced way:
The effort and time required for the care of a Medicaid patient is
often greater than that for one’s regular practice because of: (a)
The tendency for many of the patients to ignore the making and
keeping of appointments.  They either don’t show up, placing an
additional burden on the physician for retrieval, or they arrive
with four children instead of the one for whom the appointment
was made; (b) The frequent lack of telephone facilities; (c) The
restriction against telephoning prescriptions; (d) The additional
and often cumbersome paperwork; (e) The usual delay of the
agency in making payment to the physician; (f) the difficulty of
securing consultation through the usual channels.60
In a 2000 survey of pediatricians, lower payments and a greater
paperwork burden for physicians seeing patients enrolled in Medicaid-
managed care were associated with reduced participation rates, sug-
gesting a continuation of many of the same problems.61  Managed care
arrangements have increased over the past few decades such that three-
quarters of Medicaid enrollees received all or some services through
managed care in 2010.62  In a 2001 survey, physicians tended to have
negative attitudes toward Medicaid patients and Medicaid-managed
care but these attitudes did not predict acceptance of new Medicaid
patients.  About half of the physicians in the survey believed that Medi-
caid patients were more likely to sue them, and almost three-fourths
believed that Medicaid patients were likely to be noncompliant and
require extra time.  About 80% of physicians believed that Medicaid
patients have complex clinical and psychosocial problems.  Greater
than one third of physicians believed that Medicaid patients “unsettle
other patients in the waiting room.”63  On the other hand, in one 1997
survey almost 60% of physicians stated that participation in their state’s
Medicaid program was the “right thing to do.”64  The rise in the num-
ber of Medicaid patients enrolled in managed care is associated with
59. Janet B. Mitchell & Jerry Cromwell, Access to Private Physicians for Public Patients:
Participation in Medicaid and Medicare, in SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES: VOLUME 3: APPEN-
DICES, EMPIRICAL, LEGAL, AND CONCEPTUAL STUDIES 105–130 (President’s Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research ed.
1983). While this survey is older, newer surveys do not tend to ask physicians about atti-
tudes toward Medicaid enrollees that may imply biases and value judgments. See, e.g.,
Sharon K. Long, Physicians May Need More Than Higher Reimbursements to Expand Medicaid
Participation: Findings from Washington State, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1560 (2013).
60. Stephen M. Davidson, Physician Participation in Medicaid: Background and Issues, 6
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 703, 711 (1982).
61. Steve Berman et al., Factors That Influence the Willingness of Private Primary Care
Pediatricians to Accept More Medicaid Patients, 110 PEDIATRICS 239, 243 (2002).
62. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 16, at 16–17.
63. Lisa Backus et al., Specialists’ and Primary Care Physicians’ Participation in Medicaid
Managed Care, 16 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 815 (2001).
64. Frank A. Sloan & Christopher J. Conover, Physician Participation and Nonpartici-
pation in Medicaid Managed Care: The Tenncare Experience, 92 S. MED. J. 1064–65 (1999).
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the concentration of Medicaid patients among smaller numbers of phy-
sicians and practice settings.65
Together, the low fees, delays in payment, and administrative bur-
dens may act in synergistic ways with the already pervasive negative atti-
tude among physicians about Medicaid patients.  As Medicaid patients
become increasingly concentrated among a shrinking number of practi-
tioners, a question arises about how these factors may continue to per-
petuate the strong historical ties between Medicaid and charity, and
inhibit efforts to not only improve both access and quality of care, but
also to make it possible for Medicaid recipients to receive the same
care, from the same providers, that people with other types of health
insurance receive.  Although obvious, it bears noting that people who
do have health insurance through Medicaid would likely be uninsured
if Medicaid were not available.  This is one of the reasons that Medicaid
and charity care interact in a myriad of ways.  For example, states often
limit the number of days of hospital payment for patients enrolled in
Medicaid as a cost-saving measure.66  In 1983, the President’s Commis-
sion wrote that “[i]f a patient is admitted and then needs to stay past
the limit, the person must be covered as a charity case, moved to a pub-
lic hospital—or forced to leave.”67  Little has changed since.68
Yet Medicaid is sometimes credited with dealing a blow to a tradi-
tional source of charity care—the public hospitals—in what has been
called one of the “great paradoxes” of the program.69  Both Medicaid
and Medicare allowed patients who would have been charity patients to
obtain services from private hospitals to a greater extent than prior to
their enactment.70 The mass closings of public hospitals that were pre-
dicted by some did not occur after the enactment of Medicaid and
Medicare.71  Changes in the distribution of care, however, did.  From
1966 to 1980 the number of beds in urban public hospitals declined by
65. Peter Cunningham & Jessica May, Medicaid Patients Increasingly Concentrated
Among Physicians (Aug. 2006), http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/866/.
66. See, e.g., Phil Galewitz, States Are Limiting Medicaid Hospital Coverage in Search for
Savings, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/
2011/october/24/states-are-limiting-medicaid-hospital-coverage-in-search-for-savings.
aspx.
67. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES VOLUME ONE:
REPORT 157 (1983).
68. Galewitz, supra note 66.
69. ENGEL, supra note 39, at 126.
70. See Robert H. Ebert & Eli Ginzberg, The Reform of Medical Education, 7 HEALTH
AFF. 10 (1988). Medicare and Medicaid provided a:
massive infusion of money into the health care system.  Whatever the initial con-
cerns of the medical profession, these programs proved a bonanza for physicians
and for most hospitals.  Suddenly, there was public money to pay for the millions
who had previously been medically indigent.  Elderly persons, once forced to
seek care in public hospitals or in the charity wards and outpatient departments
of voluntary hospitals, now could pay for their care.
71. William Blaisdell, Development of the City-County (Public) Hospital, 129 ARCHIVES OF
SURGERY 760, 763–64 (1994).
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close to 40% while private hospital beds increased by 60%.72  Addition-
ally, the number of public hospitals declined from 1,700 in 1978 to
1,360 in 1995.73
Yet this is by no means the complete picture because public hospi-
tals, in particular, have come to rely on Medicaid funds.74  It is difficult
to assess both the subtle and not so subtle influences of provider and
institutional behaviors and their effect on the patient’s choice of hospi-
tal.  For example, in the 1970s three-fourths of the patients interviewed
at Philadelphia General Hospital preferred that hospital even when
they could go to other hospitals.  It is unknown whether this was due to
the history of hospital racial segregation in the city or some other com-
bination of factors.75  Feeling “welcome” at an institution is another
such factor.76  In other words, Medicaid has worked in both directions
to dismantle some traditional sources of charity care and to simultane-
ously shore up those same sources.  In 2010, the National Association of
Public Hospitals reported that Medicaid provided 35% of total net reve-
nue for member hospitals.  In addition to regular Medicaid payments
for services, supplemental Medicaid payments discussed below are con-
sidered essential to maintaining member hospitals’ financial well-
being.77
D. Enrollment in Medicaid Affects uncompensated care
It is difficult to determine how many people are potentially eligible
for Medicaid yet are not enrolled, and whose care then results in
uncompensated services.78  The General Accounting Office studied this
issue in two reports in the early 1990s.79 In the first report, focusing on
the District of Columbia, hospital officials estimated that they enrolled
72. Id. at 763.
73. BRUCE SIEGEL, PUBLIC HOSPITALS—A PRESCRIPTION FOR SURVIVAL 2 (1996), avail-
able at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/1996/Oct/Pub-
lic-Hospitals—A-Prescription-for-Survival.aspx.
74. Id.
75. Gary Henderson, The Impact of National Health Insurance on the Public Hospital, 9
HEALTH CARE MGMT REV. 55, 62 (1984).
76. SIEGEL, supra note 73, at 3.
77. OBAID S. ZAMAN ET AL., AMERICA’S SAFETY NET HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS,
2010: RESULTS OF THE ANNUAL NAPH HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS SURVEY, NAPH (2012),
available at http://www.naph.org/Main-Menu-Category/Publications/Safety-Net-Financ-
ing/2010-NAPH-Characteristics-Report.aspx?FT=.pdf.
78. The term “uncompensated” services is used here because this is how the term
for charity and bad debt is referred to in the literature cited. See supra note 10 and accom-
panying text.  For estimates of the number of adults and children eligible for Medicaid
and CHIP prior to 2014, see notes 112 and 113 and accompanying text.  In a recent
estimate of  the total 47.6 million uninsured population, 29% would be eligible for Medi-
caid or CHIP and 10% would fall into the coverage gap created by states that do not
implement the Medicaid expansion. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, A
CLOSER LOOK AT THE UNINSURED ELIGIBLE FOR MEDICAID AND CHIP (2013), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/8533-a-closer-look-at-the-
uninsured-eligible-for-medicaid-and-chip.pdf.
79. The General Accounting Office became the Government Accountability Office
in 2004. Our Name, GAO: U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/about/
namechange.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
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one third of patients eligible for Medicaid during admission.  Other
research had shown that 17% of District residents, not just those enter-
ing hospitals, were eligible for Medicaid but not enrolled.80  Most of the
District’s hospitals had hired proprietary vendors to enroll patients eli-
gible for Medicaid.  The vendors were paid on a contingency basis at a
cost of up to 17% of the reimbursement gained by the hospital from
the Medicaid program.81  In a follow-up study in three states, about half
of the denials for Medicaid coverage occurred for procedural reasons,
such as the applicant not providing the necessary documentation or not
appearing at a required interview.82  It is not known how many of the
denied applicants would have obtained Medicaid had they supplied the
missing documentation or interview.  When patients were asked, the
most common reasons for not providing the completed application was
the limited amount of time given, not understanding what was
required, and being unable to attain the necessary documents.  Hospi-
tal officials believed that some people were too sick or too embarrassed
to go the welfare agency for the interview.83  State welfare agencies face
penalties for enrolling people who are not eligible but do not face a
penalty for failing to enroll a person who is eligible because the applica-
tion is incomplete.84
The second report examined the issue more broadly, and
addressed the role of vendors in enrolling potential Medicaid benefi-
ciaries.  Significantly, no one can be enrolled in Medicaid without
applying for it.  Hospitals have a powerful incentive to ensure that peo-
ple who have received care enroll in Medicaid when they are eligible
because the costs are often uncompensated without enrollment.85
Medicaid covers hospitalization for ninety days prior to enrollment if
the applicant was eligible during that time.86  Although hospitals in the
follow-up study believed that the state Medicaid caseworkers should
provide more help in enrolling patients, the caseworkers were generally
too overworked and also faced prohibitions on patient advocacy since
they were also charged with final eligibility determinations.87  Two pro-
prietary vendors at one hospital in 1992 obtained an additional $10 mil-
lion in Medicaid reimbursement and were paid $2 million.88  While
hospitals employed staff to assist Medicaid applicants, the vendor firms
80. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: BARRIERS TO MEDICAID
ENROLLMENT CONTRIBUTE TO HOSPITAL UNCOMPENSATED CARE 5 (1992), available at http:/
/www.gao.gov/assets/220/217378.pdf.
81. Id. at 6.
82. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-94-176, HEALTH CARE REFORM: POTENTIAL
DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE 5 (1994), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/220023.pdf.
83. Id. at 10.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id.
87. Id.  at 13.
88. Id.
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provided more intensive assistance.89  The General Accounting Office
cited the following as one example:
The child of a single uninsured working mother incurred a
$20,000 hospital bill.  The mother also had young twins at home.
The hospital referred this case to an enrollment vendor firm after
determining that it was a potential Medicaid case.  After contact-
ing the mother, the firm initiated and submitted a Medicaid appli-
cation.  The firm gave the applicant a list of the verification items
she would have to provide.  However, the applicant did not pro-
vide the requested items and Medicaid coverage was denied.
Upon learning of the denial, the firm contacted the applicant
twice weekly for a period of 2 months to get her to cooperate by
either providing the verification document or signing a power of
attorney that would allow the firm to obtain the documents.  How-
ever, during this time, the applicant had pressing demands on her
life.  In addition to working, she was caring for her sick child and
young twins.  When the applicant stopped responding to the
firm’s many calls, the firm assigned another caseworker.  Eventu-
ally, the applicant responded and submitted the verification items
and a signed power of attorney to the firm.  The verification items
included copies of a birth certificate, a Social Security card, and
pay stubs.  According to an official at the firm, the applicant had
been carrying these items in her purse for some time but did not
attach any priority to providing them to the firm.  The signed
power of attorney allowed the firm to appeal the denial success-
fully and obtain Medicaid coverage for the children.90
Needless to say, while the benefit to hospitals and to patients in
reducing uncompensated care and medical debt, respectively, is real,
the net effect of paying proprietary vendors to enroll patients in Medi-
caid is a loss of public funds for medical care to a private for-profit
business that does not provide any medical services.91
While it is important to recognize that people who are eligible for
Medicaid may receive care that ends up as uncompensated, that is, as
bad debt or charity care, it is also the case that uninsured people are
significantly worse off than people with Medicaid coverage.92  When
people lose Medicaid coverage, they are three times more likely to lack
a regular source of care and twice as likely to have no physician visits as
compared to someone with health insurance.93  Access to care in the
Medicaid program comes close to the same level of access to care for
89. Id.
90. Id. at 24–25.
91. That being said, the General Accounting Office found not only that such firms
were used by the majority of the small sample of hospitals they surveyed in the report, but
also noted that HCFA considered them useful in helping to ensure that patients who
qualify for Medicaid were enrolled. Id. at 15.
92. Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the
First Year, 127 Q. J. ECON. 1057, 1096 (2012).
93. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid, 346 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 635, 637 (2002).
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low-income, privately insured people, though this varies by state and
between different categories of recipients.94
E. Ending Welfare as We Know It Does Not Make Medicaid Free of Stigma
Despite many similarities in access between people with Medicaid
coverage versus private coverage, Medicaid tends to remain stigmatized
through its historical connection to welfare.  Amendments to Title XIX
in the 1980s started to delink eligibility for Medicaid from eligibility for
AFDC, the federal/state cash welfare program for impoverished fami-
lies with dependent children.  As already described, the 1935 Social
Security Act established ADC based on the widely implemented
mother’s pensions.95 Both mothers’ pensions and ADC were linked in a
pejorative sense to the notion of charity.  When Medicaid was enacted,
eligibility for AFDC, or “welfare,” became one of the categories that
determined Medicaid eligibility.96 Many states accordingly used a single
application to determine eligibility for both AFDC and Medicaid.97
In 1996, under pressure to reform welfare and live up to his prom-
ise to “end welfare as we know it,” President Clinton signed the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA).  PRWORA repealed AFDC, which had been an entitle-
ment program, and replaced it with Temporary Aid to Needy Families
(TANF), a block grant program with work requirements and strict time
limits on eligibility.98 At the same time, Medicaid eligibility was
expressly delinked from cash welfare.  States maintained the option to
leave eligibility for parents with dependent children at their 1996 AFDC
level, but could expand income eligibility at their discretion.99 This
change caused confusion about the new law on all sides as well as
reports of states engaging in aggressive tactics to deter enrollees.100
Proponents of severing the link between AFDC and Medicaid argued
that not only would it allow states to expand their eligibility criteria, but
it would also decrease the stigma associated with public assistance for
those enrolled in Medicaid.  A summary of this view follows:
The decision to separate welfare and Medicaid eligibility was well
intentioned; the goal was to protect poor families’ Medicaid cover-
age from possible cutbacks in welfare.  Further, this might allow
Medicaid to begin to operate apart from welfare and some day
94. Teresa A. Coughlin et al., Assessing Access to Care under Medicaid: Evidence for the
Nation and Thirteen States, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1073, 1073 (2005).
95. See GORDON, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
96. See Moore & Smith, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
97. Judith D. Moore, Welfare Reform and Its Impact on Medicaid: An Update, 732 NAT’L
HEALTH POL’Y F. ISSUE BRIEF 1, 4 (1999), available at http://www.nhpf.org/library/issue-
briefs/IB732_WelfRef&Mcaid_2-26-99.pdf.
98. SMITH & MOORE, supra note 29, at 243–44.  In the initial years of the program,
recipients in many states had an option of either working or receiving education or train-
ing; however, many states that started with that option eventually dropped it.
99. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(a)(10) (West 2013).
100. JOST, supra note 28, at 168–70.
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evolve into a freestanding health insurance system for low-income
persons.101
In actual fact, however, a variety of direct and indirect factors led
to a reduction in health insurance even among the people who
remained eligible for cash assistance through TANF.  After TANF
implementation, women eligible for TANF were 8% and children were
3% less likely to have health insurance coverage than they were under
AFDC.102
Although PRWORA allowed states to expand Medicaid eligibility
and was seen as both a practical and symbolic severing of the link
between welfare and Medicaid, its passage was largely attributable to a
national abhorrence of “dependency.”103 The entitlement status of
AFDC ended with the enactment of PRWORA.  Its fate was more a mat-
ter of political mobilization than a well-thought-out plan to improve the
opportunities for people with a low income.  Politically, the loss of enti-
tlement status meant that cash assistance “would become, instead, a
form of public charity.  Asked what would happen to the children of
women denied cash assistance, Speaker Gingrich recommended
orphanages.”104 The implementation of TANF occurred during the
same period of time that President Clinton vetoed proposals to turn
Medicaid into a block grant program that would have ended its fiscal
entitlement status as well.105 As Michael Katz noted, the word “‘entitle-
ment’ had developed a connotation nearly as negative as ‘welfare.’”106
Often using racially coded language, the problem as many conservatives
saw it, was “[n]ot jobs, wages, or globalization, but the collapse of family
threatened America’s future, and its major source was welfare.”107
According to this view:
[T]he welfare system has paid for non-work and non-marriage and
has achieved massive increases in both.  By undermining the work
ethic and rewarding illegitimacy, the welfare system insidiously
generates its own clientele . . . .  Welfare bribes individuals into
courses of behavior which in the long run are self-defeating to the
individual, harmful to children, and increasingly a threat to
society.108
Perhaps the threat of welfare faded somewhat with its loss of entitle-
ment status but the sentiments may not have.  According to Laura Katz
Olson, views of poverty have had sticking power:
Poverty in the United States is characterized as stemming from
personal inadequacies, with welfare recipients viewed as “lazy and
101. Marilyn R. Ellwood & Leighton Ku, Welfare and Immigration Reforms: Unintended
Side Effects for Medicaid, 17 HEALTH AFF. 137, 148 (1998).
102. John Cawley et al., How Did Welfare Reform Affect the Health Insurance Coverage of
Women and Children?, 41 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 486 (2006).
103. SMITH & MOORE, supra note 29, at 246.
104. KATZ, supra note 20, at 328.
105. JOST, supra note 28, at 169.
106. KATZ, supra note 20, at 328.
107. Id. at 319.
108. Id.
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shiftless,” “welfare queens,” “deceitful,” “immoral,” and “conniv-
ing.”  For the most part, it is assumed that young adults receiving
income assistance are gaming, cheating, and abusing the system.
Government’s main role has thus been to “motivate,” “educate,”
“control,” and even “punish” individuals and their families who
have not attained sufficient funds to meet their basic needs. Blam-
ing victims, especially black and Hispanic low-income, single
mothers, has become the national norm among Democrats and
Republicans alike.109
But again, there were many people who hoped that severing Medi-
caid eligibility from AFDC would result in greater access and less
stigma.  A 1999 publication from the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration (HCFA), the organization that was created in 1977 to oversee
both Medicare and Medicaid, described the changes as “an opportunity
for states to recast and market Medicaid as a freestanding health insur-
ance program for low-income families, improving the possibility of
destigmatizing Medicaid and enhancing the potential of the program
to reach families that come into contact with the TANF system.”110 In
the intervening years, with as much as Medicaid has been able to
accomplish, it has not shed its status as somehow connected to
charity.111
Estimates prior to the implementation of the ACA showed that
over 70% of uninsured children were eligible for Medicaid or the Chil-
dren’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), yet not enrolled.112  In 2004,
about 14% of uninsured adults were eligible for Medicaid.113 When
New York’s United Hospital Fund studied the Medicaid eligibility pro-
cess in 2008, the program was still administered by local social service
agencies that were also responsible for cash assistance and food stamp
programs.  Yet other states had adopted new health insurance processes
to eliminate any stigma of “welfare” that might discourage people from
applying for coverage.114 The ACA establishes processes that streamline
eligibility determinations, enrollment and renewals of coverage, provid-
ing a “no-wrong-door” system through health insurance Marketplaces.
Individuals and families seeking coverage through Marketplaces are
screened not only for eligibility for federal subsidies to help them
purchase private coverage, but also for eligibility for Medicaid and
CHIP.115
109. OLSON, supra note 52, at 67.
110. SMITH & MOORE, supra note 29, at 247.  For information on the creation of
HCFA, see OBERLANDER, supra note 40, at 125–26.
111. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 52, at 230–31.
112. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 16, at 10.
113. Diane Rowland & Adele Shartzer, America’s Uninsured: The Statistics and Back
Story, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 618, 624 (2008).
114. BARBARA COULTER EDWARDS ET AL., MEDICAID INST. AT THE UNITED HOSP. FUND,
REFORMING NEW YORK’S MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY PROCESS: LESSONS FROM OTHER STATES 8
(2008), available at http://www.medicaidinstitute.org/assets/516.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 18083(a) (2012). See also KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, supra note 16, at 12.
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F. The Medicaid Program from the Patient’s Point of View
In 2005, the Kaiser Family Foundation surveyed the American pub-
lic on their views of the Medicaid program.  While more than half of
the people surveyed did not know about details of the program, about
the same number knew someone who was enrolled in Medicaid or had
been covered by Medicaid at some point.  According to the news
release: “Perhaps surprisingly given years of debate about Medicaid, fre-
quent references to the program as the ‘Pac Man’ of state budgets, and
periodic calls for reform, public attitudes toward Medicaid are remarka-
bly positive, and opposition to cuts is reasonably strong.”116 More than
three-quarters of the people surveyed said they would be willing to
enroll in Medicaid if they were eligible.  Medicaid was viewed almost as
favorably as Medicare and Social Security among those surveyed.117
More recently, after the economic recession began, researchers from
the Kaiser Family Foundation conducted focus groups in four commu-
nities about concerns related to their health care.  Many people who
had recently lost their jobs could not understand why Medicaid was not
available when they needed it.  One woman who lost her job and health
insurance coverage said: “It would be wonderful [to have Medicaid].  It
would be such a relief to know that if you had a problem, you’d be able
to have that taken care of and not go into the hole even further.”118
Researchers also recently conducted a study on people in Oregon who
had been selected by lottery in 2008 to be eligible for Medicaid.
Although the effects on health were difficult to determine based on
objective data because of the short time frame, self-reported health did
improve.  They report that “[t]here is . . . an overwhelming sense from
the survey outcomes that individuals feel better about their health
and . . . their interactions with the health care system.”119  Medicaid
coverage improved financial well-being, and even happiness.120
At the same time, people insured through Medicaid do often per-
ceive that their care is less than it should be.  When the American Acad-
emy of Family Physicians published their endorsement of extending
Medicaid coverage to more people in 1991, a mother of an adult son
with Down’s syndrome on Medicaid wrote a letter describing how “he
was refused care by several primary care physicians and was denied
admission by two highly respected hospitals because they did not want
116. Kaiser Family Foundation Releases National Survey of the Public’s Views About Medi-
caid, WEBWIRE (June 29, 2005), http://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?aId=3137#.
UxuH-_33DR0.
117. Id.  Correspondingly, a large majority of Americans whom Kaiser polled about
the issue reported that they either would not support any cuts whatsoever to Medicaid to
reduce the federal deficit (47%) or would support only “minor” reductions (39%).  Drew
Altman, A Public Opinion Surprise, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 4, 2011), http://kff.org/
health-reform/perspective/pulling-it-together-a-public-opinion-surprise/.
118. MICHAEL PERRY ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND. RISING HEALTH PRESSURES IN AN
ECONOMIC RECESSION: A 360° LOOK AT FOUR COMMUNITIES 8 (2009), available at http://
www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7949.pdf.
119. Finklestein, supra note 92, at 1096.
120. Id. at 1082–99; see also Katherine Baicker & Amy Finkelstein, The Effects of Medi-
caid Coverage—Learning from the Oregon Experiment, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 683, 684 (2011).
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‘another Medicaid patient.’” Although he had a fever, was severely
dehydrated, and was vomiting, the mother wrote: while “[a]drift in a
sea of white coats, the only mercy we were shown was a towel to catch
the vomitus.”121 When Medicaid managed care was being initiated
widely in Connecticut, an advocate related the following story about her
child:
I had a child who was on Medicaid and who needed to see a spe-
cialist . . . So I went out for a nine o’clock appointment . . .  I was
put in this big waiting room with a hundred people, all women
and children.  And by about 10:30 I went over and knocked on a
window and said to the woman, “I have a 9:00 appointment.” And
the woman said, “So does everyone else. . . .”  It was a very dehu-
manizing experience.122
Ronald Angel, Laura Lein, and Jane Henrici provide a nuanced
account of the situation faced by poor Americans in obtaining health
care in Poor Families in America’s Health Care Crisis.  The book provides
details from an ethnographic study of mostly minority families in three
cities along with supporting data and commentaries from other
research.  The authors describe a rarely studied, though significant,
aspect of the lives of these families that affects the health care that peo-
ple receive and whether they are enrolled in Medicaid.  This is an
account from the authors:
[T]he lives of the people we worked with were often confusing
and chaotic.  Unlike fictional accounts, the story plots are not
complete and there are often large gaps in the narratives.
Although for the most part the mothers we interviewed were
remarkably candid about their lives and were forthcoming with
information, we could not always be sure when members of the
family were employed and when they had health insurance
because their lives were simply too complex and confusing to be
easily entered into the sort of time and activity matrix that
researchers often use (or that a well crafted novel might portray).
Even in directed interviews, the sequence of events and the identi-
fication of who did what when was often unclear to us and proba-
bly to the mothers themselves.123
Throughout the book, what has been called “churning” or the
cycling on and off Medicaid is a constant.124  The complexity and insta-
121. Jane A. Zanca, Letter to the Editor, 266 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2560–61 (1991).
122. COLLEEN M. GROGAN & MICHAEL K. GUSMANO, HEALTHY VOICES, UNHEALTHY
SILENCE: ADVOCACY AND HEALTH POLICY FOR THE POOR 105 (2007).
123. RONALD J. ANGEL ET AL., POOR FAMILIES IN AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE CRISIS 5
(2006).
124. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 16, at 11.  Sommers
and Rosenbaum project that, after the health exchanges begin operating in 2014, half of
adults with income below 200% of the poverty level will experience changes in their eligi-
bility status for Medicaid or health insurance exchanges, as a result of income fluctua-
tions.  Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues In Health Reform: How Changes In
Eligibility May Move Millions Back And Forth Between Medicaid And Insurance Exchanges, 30
HEALTH AFF. 228, 232 (2011).  State-administered “basic” health plans are intended to act
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bility of the families’ circumstances were daunting and reached all
aspects of living including employment, housing, other basic necessi-
ties, and health care.  One family’s example of churning occurred in
the family of a single mother, “Cecilia.”  She lost Medicaid coverage as
well as food stamps and TANF benefits when she missed a meeting with
a caseworker during her second pregnancy.  Later, Medicaid was dis-
continued for one child because his immunizations were not up to
date.125 When Cecilia was not eligible for Medicaid, she used a local
public program but she owed hundreds of dollars to the program.
Even though the local program was intended for low-income uninsured
people and the price was discounted, it was certainly not free.126  Medi-
cal debt was mentioned by many of the people interviewed for the
book.  This is not unusual even for extremely impoverished people.
Less than half of uninsured people receive discounted prices when they
pay for medical care.127
Particularly given the expansion of Medicaid in many states and its
role in health care reform, the question of the degree to which people
may associate the program with stigma is important.  Although in the
recent Kaiser Foundation interviews many participants wanted to enroll
in Medicaid but were not eligible, some effect of stigma has been a part
of research on enrollment during previous expansions of Medicaid and
CHIP.128 Certainly the family members interviewed in the Angel, Lein,
and Henrici study often felt humiliated.  In 2000, researchers inter-
viewed 1,400 people who received health care at community health cen-
ters in order to study dimensions of stigma associated with the use of
public benefits such as cash assistance and Medicaid.  The researchers
also identified ways in which stigma and other factors affected actual
enrollment.  The belief that applying for Medicaid would involve unfair
questions and that Medicaid enrollees would not receive the same treat-
ment by physicians as people with private health insurance were associ-
ated with lower decisions to enroll.  The researchers did not find
evidence of what some have called “welfare stigma,” which is the belief
that the enrollee will feel bad about herself or that others will look
down upon her, as separate causes for not enrolling.  Changes in the
enrollment process such as applying for Medicaid at places other than a
welfare office were associated with much less stigma.129 While the “no
as a bridge for this population, so they experience stability in coverage even as the source
of coverage funding changes from Medicaid to federal subsidies and private financing.
See e.g., Ann Hwang et al., Creation of State Basic Health Programs Would Lead to 4 Percent
Fewer People Churning between Medicaid and Exchanges, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1314 (2012).
125. This disenrollment should only have affected cash assistance, not Medicaid.
126. ANGEL, supra note 123, at 3.
127. EMILY CARRIER ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE
UNINSURED AND THEIR HEALTH CARE NEEDS: HOW HAVE THEY CHANGED SINCE THE RECES-
SION? (2011), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/
8246.pdf
128. Lisa Dubay & Genevieve Kenney, The Impact of CHIP on Children’s Insurance
Coverage: An Analysis Using the National Survey of America’s Families, 44 HEALTH SERV. RES.
2040 (2009).
129. JENNIFER P. STUBER ET AL., GEO. WASH. U. MED. CENTER, BEYOND STIGMA: WHAT
BARRIERS ACTUALLY AFFECT THE DECISIONS OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES TO ENROLL IN MEDI-
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wrong door” process through health insurance Marketplaces will likely
help to reduce stigma, additional measures, such as changing organiza-
tional culture at enrollment offices to promote a welcoming attitude,
are also needed.130 States have tended to increase outreach efforts and
simplify enrollment in Medicaid when budgets are strong and to
dampen such procedures or create other barriers to enrollment and
retention during economic downturns. The recent attempts by some
states to create barriers for people who need assistance with the health
insurance Marketplace seems, however, to be primarily driven by politi-
cal opposition.131
II. THE MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL PROGRAM
IS CREATED
Another way that charity care and Medicaid became linked in com-
plex ways that continue to be debated is through the use of Medicaid
supplemental payments.  When Congress extended the Boren Amend-
ment payment standards to hospitals in 1981, which largely resulted in
states lowering Medicaid hospital payments, it also required states to
“take into account” hospitals that serve a “disproportionate number of
low-income people with special needs” when determining reimburse-
ment.132 The law explicitly allowed these funds to help pay for care of
uninsured patients, an indeterminate number of whom were receiving
charity care.  Since states were primarily interested in their new ability
to lower payments to hospitals, they largely ignored this provision.133
Only seventeen states had a designated Medicaid Disproportionate
Share Hospital (DSH) program by 1985.134
Congress amended the Medicaid DSH provisions in 1987 out of
concern that states were not implementing these additional payments.
States were now required to submit a plan describing their DSH policy.
The law also set minimum criteria for defining a hospital as a DSH hos-
pital and minimum criteria for calculating DSH adjustments.  States
were, and still are, required to designate a hospital as a DSH hospital
based either on having a Medicaid inpatient utilization rate greater
than one standard deviation above the mean for that state or based on
CAID?, (2000), available at http://sphhs.gwu.edu/departments/healthpolicy/CHPR/
downloads/beyond_stigma_no3.pdf.
130. See, e.g.,  KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, KEY LESSONS FROM
MEDICAID AND CHIP FOR OUTREACH AND ENROLLMENT UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 7
(2014) available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/8445-key-
lessons-from-medicaid-and-chip.pdf.
131. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez and Robert Pear, Florida Among States Undercutting
Health Care Enrollment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/
18/us/florida-among-states-undercutting-health-care-enrollment.html?pagewanted=all.
132. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 808 (1981); See also
SMITH & MOORE, supra note 29, at 168.
133. MICHAEL S. SPARER, MEDICAID AND THE LIMITS OF STATE HEALTH REFORM 51
(1996).
134. Robert Mechanic, Medicaid’s Disproportionate Share Hospital Program: Complex
Structure, Critical Payments, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y F. 5 (Sep. 4, 2001) available at http://
www.nhpf.org/library/background-papers/BP_MedicaidDSH_09-14-04.pdf.
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 99 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 99 Side A      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE105.txt unknown Seq: 23  1-MAY-14 14:53
2014] ON UNEASY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDICAID AND CHARITY CARE 187
having a low-income utilization rate above 25%.135 The Medicaid low-
income utilization rate is specifically calculated in part on the basis of
the percentage of charity care provided by the hospital after subsidies
for such care are subtracted.136 Beyond this minimum, states originally
had great latitude in defining other hospitals as eligible for DSH funds.
The federal match, or Federal Medical Assistance Percentage
(FMAP), is calculated based on a state’s per capita income relative to
the national average.  Although FMAP differs from state to state, on
average states pay 43% and the federal government 57% of the Medi-
caid program’s cost.137 The FMAP applies to Medicaid DSH payments,
but as originally written there was no upper limit or ceiling on the fed-
eral match for DSH payments as long as the requirements were met.138
In 1983 HCFA issued regulations that prohibited Medicaid federal
matching payments for inpatient hospital and nursing home care to no
more than what would be paid under the Medicare program, referred
to as the “Medicaid upper payment limit.”139 This limit did not have to
be adhered to in the DSH payments.
The intended purpose of the law was clearly to provide states with
matching payments for hospitals that were providing the most care to
low-income patients, whether or not the patients were covered under
Medicaid or were receiving charity care.140 What actually happened
over the next few decades was at times quite different.  A sizeable frac-
tion of DSH funds were, in a number of states, used for general revenue
purposes.  In a 1995 survey of the Medicaid DSH program in thirty-nine
states, the primary beneficiaries of the program were state govern-
ments.  One third of the DSH funds were retained by states, suggesting
that “only a small share of the funds currently generated by DSH pro-
grams are actually used to cover uncompensated care.”141 Since,
according to officials, “money is fungible” at the state level, the funds
could be used to balance overall state budgets.142 The Washington Post
called the program in 1994 “a worthy idea gone terribly awry.”143 Rand
135. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-4(b)(1) (West 2013).
136. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-4(b)(3)(B) (West 2013).  The law specifies that the Medi-
caid DSH low-income utilization rate is the sum of two ratios.  The first is the share of the
hospital’s total revenue for patient services that are paid by Medicaid or by state and local
subsidies.  The second is the percent of total hospital charges for charity care minus any
subsidies for such care. BARBARA WYNN ET AL., RAND CORP. ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT DISTRI-
BUTION OF DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL PAYMENTS, 10 (2002).
137. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 16, at 31.
138. JEAN HEARNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97–483, MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE
SHARE PAYMENTS (2005).
139. TERESA A. COUGHLIN & DAVID LISKA, URB. INST., THE MEDICAID DISPROPORTION-
ATE SHARE HOSPITAL PAYMENT PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 6 (1997), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/anf_14.pdf.
140. Wynn, supra note 136 at vii.
141. LEIGHTON KU & TERESA A. COUGHLIN, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID DISPRO-
PORTIONATE SHARE AND OTHER SPECIAL FINANCING PROGRAMS 33 (1994) available at http://
www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14
748.
142. Id. at 24.
143. Dan Morgan, Small Provision Turns into a Golden Goose; States Use Subsidy to Bal-
ance Budgets, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1994, at A1.
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Rosenblatt’s observation, made in a somewhat different context, is
apposite here: “in the name of the poor,” funds may flow “[m]ost ironi-
cally” back to those with the most political power while the “poor’s
‘social account’” is charged.144
Federal dismay over this problem concerned only secondarily the
failure of the funds to be used for uncompensated care.  The primary
concern involved the use of the funds to increase the federal share of
Medicaid payments.  The ability of states to increase the federal share of
payments arose in part from a regulation issued in 1985 by HCFA which
allowed states to receive donations from private medical care providers
or to tax providers and use these funds to draw down federal Medicaid
dollars according to the federal matching rate.145  For example, in West
Virginia the state began collecting millions of dollars in donations from
large nonprofit hospitals.  The funds became state funds, which were
then given back to the hospitals in an amount that exceeded the origi-
nal donation.  Once the hospitals were paid, the state received a federal
match but most of the match was retained by the state.  While there was
a net gain by the hospital, the largest gain was to the state budget.146
An illustration of how the program could work follows:
State A requests a donation or imposes a tax on a hospital of $10
million.  The state then makes a DSH payment of $12 million to
the hospital, either as lump sum or by means of increased Medi-
caid rates.  This nets the hospital $2 million and “costs” the state
$2 million.  The state then claims the $12 million as a “legitimate”
Medicaid expense and, assuming a fifty percent match, receives $6
million from the federal government.  Final result: the provider
netted $2 million from the transaction; the state is ahead by $4
million; the federal government is out $6 million; and Medicaid
recipients may or may not benefit from this transaction.147
Once states understood the possibility of these financing strategies,
the DSH program payments shot from less than $600 million in 1989 to
$17.4 billion in 1992.148  Program costs increased so rapidly that federal
officials became alarmed.  The Inspector General called the use of pro-
vider donations and taxes an “uncontrollable virus” and “egregious.”149
The genesis of the problem was the failure of Congress to tie the
bestowal of DSH funding to care given to specific beneficiaries and ser-
vices and to cap the total funds provided.150  Officials in the George
H.W. Bush Administration at the Office of Management and Budget,
144. Rosenblatt attributes this insight to Edward Sparer.  Rand E.  Rosenblatt,
Equality, Entitlement, and National Health Care Reform: The Challenge of Managed Competition
and Managed Care, 60 BROOK.  L.  REV. 60, 110 (1994).
145. COUGHLIN & LISKA, supra note 139, at 2–3.
146. Id. at 5–6; see also Mechanic, supra note 134.
147. SMITH & MOORE, supra note 29, at 208–09
148. Hearne cites $17.4 billion in 1992. HEARNE, supra note 138, at 4.  Mechanic
cites $600 million in 1989.  Mechanic, supra note 134, at 4.
149. HEARNE, supra note 138, at 6.
150. Id.
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and HCFA, saw the program as “highly irregular if not illegal.”151  The
political implications were powerful, threatening alliances between
state and federal government officials at both the political and budget-
ary level.  As a result, Congress embarked on measures over the next
two decades that clamped down on program loopholes, while lessening
the blow by increasing available funds.152
In 1991 Congress enacted the first legislative reform of DSH with
the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax
Amendments.153  The law was intensely negotiated between the Bush
Administration and the National Governor’s Association, and was a
compromise measure.154  The law prohibited the use of donations and
provider taxes that were not broad based.  The taxes had to be “bona
fide” and could not be written to hold providers harmless for the
cost.155  The law set a national limit of 12% of total Medicaid spending
for the DSH program, thereby curtailing further escalation of a pro-
gram that had risen from about 2% of spending in 1990 to over 13% in
1992.156  State DSH payments were also capped at the 12% level but
were to be phased up or down based on the individual state’s allotment
since some states had much higher or lower percentages of DSH.157
One effect of the cap was to lock in the highly inequitable distribu-
tion of DSH funds at the state level.  For example, by 2001 there were
five states that reported a DSH payment of at least $1,000 per resident
below the poverty level and sixteen states that reported DSH payments
of less than $100 per poverty level resident.158  The law also specifically
protected the use of intergovernmental transfers as a source of financ-
ing, considered by some to be another “loophole,” which had not been
in wide use prior to the legislation.159
A. The Growth of Medicaid DSH is Curtailed
The effect of the law was to limit the growth in the DSH program,
though the controversies were far from over.  The DSH program by this
time had become politically explosive and a vehicle for fundamentally
divergent strategies among powerful stakeholders.160  As David Smith
and Judith Moore put it,
[T]he DSH experience provides a good example of how the flexi-
bility and loopholes in our American system of fiscal federalism
151. John K.  Iglehart, The American Health Care System—Medicaid, 328 NEW ENG.  J.
MED. 896, 898 (1993).
152. OLSON, supra note 52, at 210.
153. COUGHLIN & LISKA, supra note 139, at 3.
154. Id.
155. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b(w)(2)(B) (West 2013); see also Teresa A. Coughlin et al.,
Reforming the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Program, 22 HEALTH CARE FIN.  REV.
137, 139 (2000).
156. Teresa A. Coughlin & David Liska, Changing State and Federal Payment Policies for
Medicaid Disproportionate-Share Hospitals, 17 HEALTH AFF., 118, 118–19 (1998).
157. HEARNE, supra note 138, at 6.
158. Mechanic, supra note 134, at 9.
159. HEARNE, supra note 138, at 6–7.
160. Morgan, supra note 143.
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enable venturesome and public-spirited officials to work a power
of good.  They also reward the shrewd and greedy, punish those
who live by the rules and make do with their share, and breed lies,
hypocrisy, distrust, and cynicism.161
The use of intergovernmental transfers in which states use public
funds from state, local, or county health care facilities as the state match
works in much the same way as we saw above, with the provider dona-
tions and taxes that federal law had partially curtailed.  Inventive states
willing to push the line also began to use other practices.  Some states,
for example, reported grossly inflated charges at public hospitals, or
paid significantly more in DSH payments to certain hospitals than the
total cost of caring for Medicaid and uninsured patients.162  Others
provided DSH payments to hospitals with few Medicaid patients, espe-
cially at mental hospitals where most care for adults is the financial
responsibility of the state.163  As a response to these continued
problems, in 1993 Congress imposed a hospital-specific limit to DSH
payments, which could be no more that the total cost of unreimbursed
care to Medicaid enrollees and uninsured patients for an individual
hospital.164  The 1993 amendments also prohibited DSH payments to
hospitals, such as mental health institutions, that did not have at least a
1% Medicaid utilization rate.165
The hospital-specific limits were transitioned such that certain, usu-
ally state-owned, hospitals could continue to receive DSH payments of
up to 200% of their Medicaid shortfall and uninsured cost.  Congress
made exceptions to the hospital-specific limit on DSH payment several
times.  In 2000, for example, the hospital-specific limit for public hospi-
tals for the years 2003 and 2004 was increased from 100% to 175% of
the unreimbursed Medicaid and uninsured cost.166  The Office of the
Inspector General, upon review of this prospective increase, concluded
that it should either be delayed or repealed, finding multiple irregulari-
ties.167  CMS agreed, yet the increase in DSH limits for public hospitals
was left intact for those years.168
161. SMITH & MOORE, supra note 29, at 208.
162. HEARNE, supra note 138, at 7.
163. Mechanic, supra note 134, at 8.
164. HEARNE, supra note 138, at 7.
165. Id. at 7–8.
166. The Medicare, Medicaid, and State Child Health Insurance Program Benefits
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA 2000) required that public hospitals in
all states have a DSH limit of 175% of uncompensated care cost for the two fiscal years
beginning after September 2002.  California’s public hospitals already had this higher
limit. Memorandum from Inspector General Janet Rehnquist for Administrator for Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services Thomas Scully (Dec. 27, 2001), available at
https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region6/60100069.pdf.
167. These included findings that as much as 90% of DSH payments to some hospi-
tals were returned to the state; the calculation of uncompensated care costs varied widely;
many hospitals overstated uncompensated care costs; and some states included the cost of
providing care to prisoners even though this was not supposed to be allowed. Id. at 6–9.
168. Id.  This is consistent with the history of the DSH program as “intensely politi-
cal and rife with special deals.”  Mechanic, supra note 134, at 8.
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When forty states were surveyed about their DSH programs in
1997, states were netting 40% of the financial gains while hospitals were
receiving about 60% of new additional funds.169  As mentioned, Con-
gress continued to pay attention to DSH payments to hospitals, though
it still vacillated between curtailing and expanding the program.  Relia-
ble and detailed information on DSH programs did not exist, and states
resisted attempts to develop accurate reporting systems.170  In the 1997
Balanced Budget Amendment, Congress required states to report to
HCFA the methodology it used to identify and make payments to DSH
hospitals on the basis of the proportion of low-income and Medicaid
patients served by the hospitals, and to include individual hospital
information.171  In a 2002 RAND/Urban Institute report, however,
researchers found that “compliance with this requirement appears lax
and federal enforcement is limited.”172  Even the most minimal infor-
mation was often not provided by states, such as accurate hospital iden-
tification.173  The state DSH payment reports also sometimes correlated
poorly with information generated by HCFA providing an accounting
of state DSH expenditures, calling the former’s accuracy into
question.174
B. Other Medicaid Maximization Strategies Are Utilized
In response to the tightening federal strictures on DSH payments,
states began to use other “Medicaid maximization” strategies to
increase the federal share of funds.  One of the primary ways states
could do this was through creative exploitation of the upper payment
limit rules (UPL).  While the Medicaid DSH program is mandatory for
states, UPL “programs” are not. The schema underlying funding of the
state portion of UPL resembles that of the DSH program in DSH’s early
years.  A Louisiana journalist described the process: “Borrow $20 from a
friend.  Show it to your Dad.  He gives you $50.  Give the $20 back to
your friend.  Walk away with a wallet $50 fatter.”175  The UPL payments
169. Coughlin, supra note 155, at 155.
170. Mechanic, supra note 134, at 9.
171. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub.  L. No. 105–33, § 4721 (1997):
A State plan under this title shall not be considered to meet the requirements of
section 1902(a)(13)(A)(iv) (insofar as it requires payments to hospitals to take
into account the situation of hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of
low-income patients with special needs), as of October 1, 1998, unless the State
has submitted to the Secretary by such date a description of the methodology
used by the State to identify and to make payments to disproportionate share
hospitals, including children’s hospitals, on the basis of the proportion of low-
income and Medicaid patients served by such hospitals.  The State shall provide
an annual report to the Secretary describing the disproportionate share pay-
ments to each such disproportionate share hospital.
172. WYNN, supra note 140, at 107.
173. Id. at 107–08.
174. Id. at 108.  The authors cite to one example, in which “Pennsylvania’s hospital
specific report for FY 1998 showed a total of $41 million in DSH payments whereas the
state claimed $546 million in DHS payments on Form HCFA-64.”
175. Steve Ritea, Transfer System Could Save Medicaid, but It Might Be Too Late for LA to
Get on Board, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr.  2, 2000) (quoted in ANDY SCHNEIDER & DAVID ROUS-
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are based on the difference between what Medicare pays and what
Medicaid pays for comparable services.176 Federal law provides that
such aggregate Medicaid expenditures may not exceed what Medicare
would have paid for the same services.177 Because states’ Medicaid rates
are generally much lower than Medicare, these states can make large
payments—UPL payments—to a specific hospital or category of hospi-
tals without violating the aggregate upper payment limits. As long as the
aggregate limit is not breached, a single hospital or class of hospitals
does not have a limit on the UPL funds received.178  When these UPL
payments are made to public hospitals, some states’ general funds ulti-
mately reap most of the benefits.  For example, a 2004 General
Accounting Office (GAO) report described how Michigan provided
$122 million to county hospitals as a UPL payment.179  The federal
match for these payments was $155 million, making a total of $277 mil-
lion that was provided to the county hospitals under the UPL pro-
gram.180  Later the same day, the county hospitals, through an
intergovernmental transfer, sent all but about $6 million of the funds
back to the state through an intergovernmental transfer.  These funds
were deposited into a separate general fund that “recycled” the result-
ing $149 million in now-“state” dollars to generate additional federal
matching dollars.181  The GAO found that some states clearly used the
funds for non-Medicaid purposes, such as K-12 education.182  The
“absence of reliable data protects states that engage in questionable
practices and limits the momentum of efforts to change the program in
ways that would benefit low-income patients.”183
Although the Medicaid DSH and UPL programs have been
described as a “tug-of-war” between the federal and state governments,
over time the federal government has curbed some of the most fiscally
problematic practices.184  In the case of DSH, Congress capped total
funding for states on several different occasions, most recently under
the ACA.185 In a 2006 survey of thirty-five states, Teresa Coughlin and
SEAU, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, UPPER PAYMENT LIMITS: REALITY AND
ILLUSION IN MEDICAID FINANCING 2 (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
4043-index.cfm.).
176. Other supplemental Medicaid payments are made on the basis of 1115 Waiv-
ers which are state specific demonstrations approved by CMS. U.S.  GOV’T ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFFICE, GAO-08-614, MEDICAID: CMS NEEDS MORE INFORMATION ON THE BILLIONS OF
DOLLARS SPENT ON SUPPLEMENTAL PAYMENTS 6 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08614.pdf.
177. 42 C.F.R.  § 447.272(b)(2) (2013).
178. Mechanic, supra note 134, at 9.
179. U.S.  GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-574T, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
TRANSFERS HAVE FACILITATED STATE FINANCING SCHEMES 5–6 (2004), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d04574t.pdf.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 8–9.
183. Mechanic, supra note 134, at 14.
184. SONYA SCHWARTZ ET AL., MOVING BEYOND THE TUG OF WAR: IMPROVING MEDI-
CAID FISCAL INTEGRITY 6 (2006), available at http://nashp.org/sites/default/files/Medi-
caid_Fiscal_Integrity.pdf?q=Files/Medicaid_Fiscal_Integrity.pdf.
185. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-4(f) (West 2013).
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colleagues found that the intergovernmental transfer of funds back to
the state had greatly decreased and accounted for less than 1% of
spending.  Yet at the same time, if the IGTs and provider taxes that the
state used to fund the supplemental payments are subtracted from the
total being paid to providers, the share of the spending in these pro-
grams attributable to federal funds was 80%, suggesting that some of
the problems that most interested federal officials were continuing.186
With respect to UPL, while the federal government limited UPL pay-
ments by tightening the state methodology for calculating them, the
government’s ability to assess the payments being made was particularly
difficult because of the lack of accurate reporting methods.187  The
GAO was unable to provide any estimate of the total national 2006 non-
DSH supplemental payments such as UPL, stating “the total amount
and distribution of payments made in fiscal year 2006 is unknown
because states did not separately report all their payments to CMS.”188
While Medicaid supplemental payment programs may have
allowed federal funds to stabilize state budgets and maintain Medicaid
services in difficult economic circumstances, the evidence is mixed.  As
mentioned earlier, it is clear that in some states the funds were not used
for health care purposes, and were instead used for general revenue
purposes.189  Even though some of these funds are presumably used to
make positive changes, states as well as hospitals have had wide discre-
tion and little accountability for the use of the funds over much of the
life of the program.190  Supplemental funds “count” toward total Medi-
caid spending, yet are not always used, as we have seen, to provide
actual care for Medicaid recipients.  This discrepancy not only distorts
the relationship between Medicaid spending and care provided
through the program,191 but also may increase the likelihood of cuts to
the program, to the extent they cause taxpayers to view the Medicaid
program as both profligate and overfunded.192  It may be convenient to
“charge” supplemental payments, in all their myriad uses, to the “social
account” of the poor, but the injustice is manifest.
C. Medicaid, DSH, and the Safety Net
Even though it has been difficult to trace all the ultimate uses to
which DSH and UPL funds have been put, proponents of the health
186. Teresa A. Coughlin et al., Restoring Fiscal Integrity to Medicaid Financing?, 26
HEALTH AFF. 1469, 1478 (2007).
187. See, e.g., GAO-08-614, supra note 176, at 21–22.  The UPL regulations may be
found at 42 C.F.R. § 447.321 (2012).
188. GAO-08-614, supra note 176, at 6.  The report states that CMS had determined
that $23 billion was spent on DSH and non-DSH supplemental payments in 2006, but the
information was incomplete.
189. SCHNEIDER & ROUSSEAU, supra note 175.
190. Karen Matherlee, The Federal-State Medicaid Match: An Ongoing Tug-of-War over
Practice and Policy, 760 NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y F. 7 (2000), available at http://www.nhpf.org/
library/issue-briefs/IB760_MedicaidMatch_12-15-00.pdf.
191. SCHNEIDER & ROUSSEAU, supra note 175.
192. See, e.g., Ed Sparer, Gordian Knots: The Situation of Health Care Advocacy for the
Poor Today, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 2–3 (1981).
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care safety net have become one of the biggest stakeholders in the
debate concerning the funds.  Patricia Gabow, the chief at Denver
Health, described her state’s reluctance to fully take advantage of fed-
eral DSH payments in the late 1990s when a legislator claimed that
“DSH is the cocaine of public hospitals.”193  Gabow’s view was different:
We saw it more like penicillin.  How do you transform cocaine
into penicillin?  And why shouldn’t the federal government sup-
port safety-net hospitals like ours, when these institutions provide
our national health insurance by default?  We needed to convince
one of the smartest and most powerful legislators who opposed
DSH to support accessing these dollars.194
When the DSH program was enacted, the term “safety net” was not
often used to refer to health care.195  President Reagan used the meta-
phor “social safety net” in 1981, with William Safire declaring in that
year that “[a]dministration spokesmen carry the safety net around as a
kind of security blanket.”196 In the midst of severe cuts to social welfare
programs, Safire proclaimed: “Using the circus metaphor of a ‘safety
net,’ the budget cutters seek to allay fears of many of the ‘truly needy’
(but not, one assumes, of the ‘falsely needy’) that society is not about to
shove them off the high wire onto the sawdust below.”197
By 1999, the “health care safety net” was firmly entrenched in the
health policy and medical literature.  Writing for the National Associa-
tion of Public Hospitals and Health Systems (NAPH) in 1999, Lynne
Fagnani and Jennifer Tolbert described “safety net hospitals” as “those
whose stated mission is to provide care to anyone in need regardless of
their ability to pay.”198  These authors explain that the major sources of
funding for unreimbursed care provided at safety net hospitals are state
and local tax appropriations, and the Medicare and Medicaid DSH pro-
grams.  Even though hospitals that were members of NAPH transferred
almost 70% of their Medicaid DSH payments back to their state treasur-
ies in 1996, the Medicaid DSH program still managed to raise Medicaid
payments above costs to member hospitals.199  The authors take partic-
ular note of how the DSH program lacked accountability for how the
funds were spent and that this was a major barrier to reforming the
program.  There was simply no national data on “how states spend DSH
193. Patricia A. Gabow, Making a Public Hospital Work, 20 HEALTH AFF. 182, 186
(2001).
194. Id. at 186.
195. SMITH & MOORE, supra note 29, at 157.
196. William Safire, On Language; Safety Nets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1981 § 6 (Maga-
zine Desk), at 9.
197. Id.
198. LYNNE FAGNANI & JENNIFER TOLBERT, NAT’L ASS’N OF PUB. HOSPS. AND HEALTH
SYS., THE DEPENDENCE OF SAFETY NET HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS ON THE MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL PAYMENT PROGRAMS 1 (1999).
199. Id. at 9, 19.
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funds, who receives them, how much individual entities receive, and
how states finance their share of the program.”200
As mentioned above, little is known as well about how hospitals
that receive DSH payments use the funds.  In a 1995 survey, hospital
officials told surveyors that DSH revenue usually was placed in the hos-
pital’s general operating fund where the money could have indirectly
covered the cost of uncompensated care and Medicaid underpay-
ments.201  Some hospital officials told surveyors that the funds were
used specifically to expand services in the clinics.  Some hospitals used
the funds as “short-term windfalls” and made many types of capital
expenditures.202  Since the Medicaid and DSH funds cannot usually be
traced, there are few ways, other than surveys, to determine the impact
of the funds.  Such surveys necessarily depend on the reliability of the
reporter.  The answers may indeed have been accurate, though unver-
ifiable.  One study has provided evidence that patient mortality rates
decline in inverse proportion to the availability of DSH funds at public
hospitals.203  This effect was hypothesized to be due to greater
resources as a result of the funds.204  Another study found that the non-
profit hospital provision of uncompensated care in California fell fol-
lowing the 1997 DSH reductions, but the reduction was inelastic in
value, that is, only loosely correlated with the size of the reduction.205
Studies such as these provide indirect support for the hospital officials’
likely veracity in the survey.  There is the possibility, however, that
responses to the survey question about the use of DSH funds could, for
example, reflect social desirability bias.206  The safety net hospital offi-
cials may have perceived that it would be expected and socially desira-
ble to report that the funds were used to provide services related to the
needs of Medicaid and uninsured low-income patients.  Without objec-
tively verifiable data, a definitive determination cannot be made.
In other research, subsidies provided to hospitals in New York in
the 1980s on the basis of the cost of uncompensated care did increase
the provision of charity care modestly when matching payments were
provided.207  When lump sums were provided, however, charity care
did not increase.208  The authors concluded that “hospital subsidies
appear relatively inefficient in targeting revenues toward the uninsured
200. OBAID S. ZAMAN ET AL., NAT’L. PUB. HEALTH AND HOSP. INST. AMERICA’S SAFETY
NET HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS, 2010: RESULTS OF THE ANNUAL NAPH HOSPITAL
CHARACTERISTICS SURVEY (2012).
201. KU & COUGHLIN, supra note 141.
202. Id.
203. Katherine Baicker & Douglas Staiger, Fiscal Shenanigans, Targeted Federal Health
Care Funds, and Patient Mortality, 120 Q. J. ECON. 345 (2005).
204. Id.
205. Hui-Min Hseih & Gloria J. Bazzoli, Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Pay-
ment: How Does It Impact Hospitals’ Provision of Uncompensated Care?, 49 INQUIRY J. 254
(2012).
206. Robert A. Pearlman & Helene E. Starks, Quantitative Surveys, in METHODS IN
MED. ETHICS 233–40 (Jeremy Sugarman & Daniel P. Sulmasy eds., 2010).
207. Kenneth E. Thorpe & Charles E. Phelps, The Social Role of Not-for-Profit Organiza-
tions: Hospital Provision of Charity Care, 29 J. ECON. INQUIRY 482 (1991).
208. Id.
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 103 Side B      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 103 Side B      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE105.txt unknown Seq: 32  1-MAY-14 14:53
196 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28
patient.  Hospitals use some of the revenues received from the pool to
support uncompensated care, but a substantial fraction went to support
other hospital activities or were simply retained.”209  This is worrisome
with respect to supplemental payments, as they much more closely
resemble lump sum payments than matching payments made on the
basis of the cost of uncompensated care.  As already discussed, UPL
payments have no connection with the cost or volume of uncompen-
sated care that a hospital provides, and DSH payments, while capped at
the total amount a hospital expended on uncompensated care, often
have little connection with that figure, and, like UPL payments, are
often diminished through IGTs.  Toward that point, in another study of
all hospitals nationwide in the decade from 1990 to 2000, researchers
found that Medicaid DSH spending had no statistically significant effect
on hospital uncompensated care.  The estimate was considered to be
robust and left the researchers asking, “where are the (marginal) Medi-
caid DSH dollars going?”210
Not all hospitals that receive supplemental payments are in similar
circumstances with respect to the role the funds play in their organiza-
tions.  NAPH (renamed America’s Essential Hospitals in 2013) contin-
ues to be a vocal stakeholder in the Medicaid DSH discussion, and the
organization makes a strong case for DSH funds improving the finan-
cial status of safety net hospitals.  In 2010, nearly 20% of the care NAPH
hospitals provided was delivered to uninsured patients, and nearly 30%
was provided to Medicaid patients—numbers far in excess of those at
non-safety net hospitals.211  Medicaid DSH payments covered almost a
quarter of the cost of NAPH member hospitals’ unreimbursed care that
year, and other Medicaid supplemental payments covered more than
10% more.212  The definition of unreimbursed care used by NAPH,
however, is not the same as the cost of Medicaid shortfalls and unin-
sured costs (the costs that DSH payments are directed toward) because
it includes losses from Medicare patients as well.213  A 2010 NAPH
report observed that “Medicaid DSH and other supplemental Medicaid
payments are essential to the financial viability of safety net hospi-
tals.”214  Reflecting the generally more precarious financial status of
safety net hospitals, the average margin for NAPH members was just
over 2% in 2010 while the average margin for all hospitals was just over
7%.215  Without Medicaid DSH, the overall NAPH member margin
would have dropped to negative 6%, and even further to negative 10%
without UPL payments.216
209. Id.
210. See Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Dorian G. Seamster, How Federal and State Policies
Affected Hospital Uncompensated Care Provision in the 1990s, 64 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 731,
740 (2007).  The authors were unable to determine at what point the funds became
untraceable, that is, the funds were not traceable at either the state or hospital level.
211. ZAMAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 13.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 19.
214. Id. at 15.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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III. MEDICAID DSH REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ARE FINALLY
IMPLEMENTED IN 2010
In an effort to obtain data that had long been missing, Congress
added a provision to the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) that required states to report
specific data on their DSH programs to CMS and to obtain an indepen-
dent certified audit verifying certain data concerning uncompensated
care and payments to hospitals.217  This requirement was to be imple-
mented beginning in 2004, but CMS did not issue proposed regulations
implementing the law until 2005.  The proposed rule was not finalized
until 2008, and was to be implemented in 2009 with states reporting on
their DSH programs for the years 2005 and 2006.218 In a letter to state
Medicaid directors, however, states were told they would not be consid-
ered out of compliance unless they failed to provide the reports by
2010.219 In the letter, CMS went even further to ensure compliance by
stating that the information from the years 2005 to 2010 in the reports
“will not be given weight except to the extent that the findings draw
into question the reasonableness of State uncompensated care cost esti-
mates used for calculations of prospective DSH payments for Medicaid
State plan year 2011 and thereafter.”220
As mentioned previously, the DSH rules specify that one method
for determining which hospitals must receive payments is based in part
on the amount of uncompensated care provided by the hospital.221
DSH payments, by statute, are directed toward hospitals that “serve a
disproportionate number of low-income patients with special needs.”222
The first component of uncompensated care, for the purpose of the
state DSH report required under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4, is the
unreimbursed cost of care for Medicaid patients, and the second com-
ponent is the unreimbursed cost of care for uninsured patients.223
Since 1993, federal matching DSH payments may be made to a hospital
up to its hospital-specific limit, which consists of these two components
of uncompensated care.224
217. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396r-4(j)(1)-(2) (West 2013).
218. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-69, MEDICAID: ONGOING FEDERAL
OVERSIGHT OF PAYMENTS TO OFFSET UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE COSTS IS WARRANTED
(2009).
219. Letter from Jackie Garner, Acting Director, Center for Medicaid & State Oper-
ations, to State Medicaid Directors (July 27, 2009), available at http://www.wsha.org/
files/65/Final_DSH_7.27.09.pdf.
220. Id.
221. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-4(b)(3)(B) (West 2013).
222. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-4(a)(1) (West 2013).
223. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 447.299(c)(11), (15); 73 Fed. Reg. 77,904, 77,904 (2008)
(“Under those hospital specific limits, a hospital’s DSH payments may not exceed the
costs incurred by that hospital in furnishing services during the year to Medicaid patients
and the uninsured, less other Medicaid payments made to the hospital, and payments
made by uninsured patients (‘uncompensated care costs’).”).
224. As already mentioned, in some years, public hospitals could receive federal
matching payments for up to 200% of their uncompensated care costs, though these
increased payments ended in 2004.  Mechanic, supra note 134, at 14.
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A point of considerable controversy has been the definition of
“patients who have no health insurance or source of third party pay-
ment for services provided” for the purpose of calculating a hospital’s
DSH limit.  Since 1994, based on guidance from HCFA, states have
been permitted to use their definition of “allowable costs” from their
Medicaid state plan or from any other definition they choose.225
Accordingly, most states included costs incurred by patients who had no
coverage for the specific service provided, rather than including only
costs due to a patient’s complete lack of health insurance. This allowed
hospitals to count the cost of services that were uncompensated because
an individual exceeded his annual or lifetime coverage limits, for exam-
ple, or because his policy expressly did not cover the service in ques-
tion.  When the Bush Administration published the final rule on the
MMA’s DSH reporting requirements in 2008, however, this convention
was changed.  Under the 2008 final rule, “patients who have no health
insurance or source of third party payment for services provided”
referred not to coverage of the services, but to coverage of the individ-
ual him- or herself, whether or not his or her insurance covered the
services in question.226  The 2008 rule also did not consider whether
the costs are attributable to charity care or bad debt; rather, CMS
required hospitals to segregate charges based on an individual’s insur-
ance status alone for the purpose of calculating a hospital’s DSH
limit.227
The American Hospital Association and other hospital organiza-
tions decried the change in the definition of an uninsured person in
the 2008 regulations.228  In response, in January 2012, CMS proposed a
rule that would return the definition to its 1994 meaning.  The defini-
tion clarifies that the calculation of the DSH limit includes costs for
services provided to patients when a cap has been reached or when a
225. Letter from Sally K. Richardson, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & State Operations,
Health Care Fin. Admin., to all State Medicaid Dirs. (Aug. 17, 1994), available at http://
downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-downloads/SMDL/downloads/SMD081794.pdf
(stating that “HCFA believes it would be permissible for states to include in this definition
individuals who do not have health insurance which would apply to the service for which
the individual sought treatment”).
226. Medicaid Program; Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments, 73 Fed. Reg.
77,904, 77,911 (Dec. 19, 2008).  This did not include payments made under a state or
local program for the indigent or uninsured. Id. at 77,913.
227. Id. at 77,914.
228. See, e.g., Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass’n., to
Marilyn Tavenner, Acting Adm’r., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Re: CMS 2315-P:
Medicaid; Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments–Uninsured Definition, (Vol. 77,
No. 11) (Jan. 18, 2012) (on file with author) available at http://www.aha.org/advocacy-
issues/letter/2012/120216-cl-cms-2315-p.pdf; Letter from Bruce Siegel, President & CEO,
Nat’l Ass’n of Pub. Hosps., to Marilyn Tavenner, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., Re: CMS-2315-P: Medicaid Program; Disproportionate Share Hospital
Payments –Uninsured Definition, (Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with author) available at http://
www.naph.org/Main-Menu-Category/Our-Work/Safety-Net-Financing/Medicaid-and-
DSH/DSH-Reporting-and-Audit-Rule/NAPH-Submits-Comments-on-Proposed-Rule-
Regarding-Medicaid-DSH-Uninsured-Definition-January-2012.aspx?FT=.pdf.
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specific service is not covered under the patient’s health plan.229 It
would expressly bring costs of care for the underinsured into the ambit
of the DSH limit.  CMS, however, has not finalized the rule, and instead
issued a technical correction and clarifying language in May 2012 that is
consistent with an interpretation that the uninsured definition refers to
the service provided and not the person.230  It may be that with the
ultimate elimination of annual and lifetime limits from most health
insurance policies and “essential health benefit” requirements for indi-
vidual and small group policies enacted through the ACA, the issue of
whether or how to count uncompensated costs of care provided to the
underinsured will dwindle to relative insignificance.231 In the
meantime, however, the 2008 rule remains in effect with only the May
2012 changes having been made.
Given Medicaid’s long history of determining eligibility for benefits
in part by examining an applicant’s income and assets, it is perhaps
surprising that neither income nor assets are considered in determin-
ing whether an individual has “no health insurance or source of third
party payment for services provided,” for the purpose of a hospital’s
DSH limit.  It is insurance status and scope of coverage that are relevant
in determining the DSH program hospital-specific limit, and not the
fact of being indigent.232 Allowable costs, according to the final rule,
may be on the books as bad debt or charity.  As long as the cost is from
an uninsured person, no matter what her income or wealth might be, it
is allowable.233 On the other hand, bad debt related to nonpayment of
deductibles and co-pays is not an allowable cost because it is attributa-
ble to people with health insurance coverage for the service pro-
vided.234 Insurance claims that are denied as a result of improper
billing are not allowed to be included for the same reason.235 On the
payment side, supplemental payments such as UPL payments must be
counted as reimbursement when calculating a hospital’s total uncom-
pensated care costs.236 Yet, when a service is provided to a patient
whose care is paid for by a state or local indigent health care program,
229. For the text of the proposed rule, see Medicaid Program; Disproportionate
Share Hospital Payments—Uninsured Definition, 77 Fed. Reg. 2500, 2506–07 (Jan. 18,
2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 447.295).
230. 77 Fed. Reg. 31,499, 31,504, 31513 (May 29, 2012).
231. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-11(a)(1)(A), (B) (West 2013); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18022(b)(1) (West 2013).
232. Medicaid Program; Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments, 73 Fed. Reg.
77,904, 77,911 (Dec. 19, 2008).
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 447.299(c)(15)(iii) (2013):
The uninsured uncompensated amount also cannot include amounts associated
with unpaid co-pays or deductibles for individuals with third party coverage for
the inpatient and/or outpatient hospital services they receive or any other
unreimbursed costs associated with inpatient and/or outpatient hospital services
provided to individuals with those services in their third party coverage benefit
package.
235. Medicaid Program; Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments, 73 Fed. Reg.
77,904, 77,913 (Dec. 19, 2008).
236. 42 C.F.R. § 447.299(c)(11) (2013).
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the costs are not counted as amounts that are received on behalf of
patients for the purpose of DSH limits.237 Presumably, this is because
the DSH program payments are not intended to diminish the state and
local commitment to indigent care, though this means that in some
cases there could be substantial double payments to a hospital for
patients covered under an indigent care program.238
A. Medicaid DSH and the Affordable Care Act
When health care reform began to be seriously negotiated in 2009,
hospital associations agreed to reductions in Medicaid DSH payments
as one part of a deal under which over 90% of the nation’s population
would become insured.239 When enacted, the ACA reduced Medicaid
DSH payments beginning in 2014 with two years of relatively small
reductions followed by larger reductions. By 2019, the reductions
represent nearly half of the federal matching payments that would have
been available without reform.240 The total reduction in federal DSH
spending was $18.1 billion through 2020 but Congress extended the
reductions twice through 2022 for a total reduction of $22 billion.241
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently reported
that $17.6 billion in federal and state DSH payments were made in
2010.242 About $14.4 billion in non-DSH supplemental payments, some
of which were UPL payments, were made in 2010, but the exact amount
is not known because some states did not separately report non-DSH
payments.  The federal share of the combined total of the roughly $32
billion in DSH and other Medicaid supplemental payments was approx-
imately $19.8 billion.243 These payments were equal to roughly one
237. Id.
238. States and counties support public hospitals in a patchwork fashion and also
target programs for people not eligible for Medicaid through various efforts.  For exam-
ple, by 1985, thirty-four states had indigent health care programs. RANDOLPH A. DESONIA
& KATHLEEN KING, INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH POLICY PROJECT, GEO. WASH. U., STATE
PROGRAMS OF ASSISTANCE FOR THE MEDICALLY INDIGENT (1985).
239. Matthew DoBias & Jennifer Lubell, The Numbers Game: DSH Payments, Uninsured
Counts Roil Senate, 39 MODERN HEALTHCARE 8 (2009), available at http://www.
modernhealthcare.com/article/20090928/NEWS/909259995.
240. Deborah Bachrach et al., Toward a High Performance Health Care System for Vul-
nerable Populations: Funding for Safety-Net Hospitals, Commonwealth Fund (Mar. 8, 2012),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2012/Mar/Vulnera-
ble-Populations.aspx. See also, CHRISTIE PROVOST PETERS, THE BASICS: MEDICAID DISPRO-
PORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL (DSH) PROGRAM (2009).
241. Katherine Neuhausen et. al., State Politics and the Fate of the Safety Net, 369 New
Eng. J. Med.1675 (2013). See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-694, MEDI-
CAID: STATES REPORTED BILLIONS MORE IN SUPPLEMENTAL PAYMENTS IN RECENT YEARS 7
(2012); Alison Mitchell, Cong. Research Serv. R42865 Medicaid Disproportionate Share
Hospital Payments 11,22 (2013) available at http://www.healthreformgps.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/dsh-crs-12-9.pdf (describing the extensions of the DSH reductions enacted
by Congress and the updated total reduction.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 9.
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third of Medicaid hospital fee-for-service payments.244 DSH and UPL
payments, in other words, are a significant part of hospital reimburse-
ment.  In some states, the importance of Medicaid supplemental pay-
ments is particularly great.  For example, in 2002, five states reported
that their DSH payments exceeded regular Medicaid payments for inpa-
tient hospitalizations.245
Hospital associations, researchers, and advocates for the safety net
increasingly urged policymakers to reconsider the DSH reductions fol-
lowing the Supreme Court ruling and with only about half of the states
planning to expand Medicaid.246 Two proposed bills before Congress
postponed the reductions and the President’s budget proposal
included a one-year delay in the reductions.247 Therefore it was not
surprising that the bipartisan budget agreement signed by President
Obama in December included a two year delay in the reductions. The
Medicaid DSH reductions remain budget neutral through a doubling
of the reduction for 2016 and an extension of the reductions through
2023.248
Prior to the enactment of the two year delay, CMS had finalized its
proposed rules on the Medicaid DSH Health Reform Methodology
(DHRM) which are substantively largely the same as the proposed
rules.249  The final rules were to be in effect for only two years.250 As
directed under the ACA, CMS imposed the largest percentage reduc-
tions on either (1) states with the lowest percentage of uninsured
residents, or (2) those which fail to target their DSH payments to hospi-
tals with high Medicaid inpatient and uncompensated care volumes.251
“Low DSH” states would be subject to a smaller reduction.252 Finally,
CMS must “[take] into account the extent to which the DSH allotment
for a State was included in the budget neutrality calculation for a cover-
age expansion approved under section 1115 as of July 31, 2009.”253 In
the final rules, CMS expressly did not consider what effect, if any, a
state’s decision to take up the ACA’s Medicaid expansion would have
244. Deborah Bachrach & Melinda Dutton, Center for Health Care Strategies,
Medicaid Supplemental Payments: Where Do They Fit in Payment Reform? (2011), avail-
able at http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/Medicaidsupplementalpaymentbrief.pdf.
245. HEARNE, supra note 138, at 13.
246. Neuhausen, supra note 241, at 1675.
247. Mitchell, supra note 241, at 12.
248. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-67, 127 Stat. 1165 § 1204.
249. Medicaid Program; State Disproportionate Share Hospital Allotment Reduc-
tions, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,293 (Sept. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447). The
proposed rules were published four months earlier: Medicaid Program; State Dispropor-
tionate Share Hospital Allotment Reductions, 78 Fed. Reg. 28,551 (May 15, 2013) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447).
250. 78 Fed. Reg. 57,293 (Sept. 18, 2013).
251. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-4(f)(7)(B)(i) (West 2013); 78 Fed. Reg. 57, 293, 57,294,
57,304-57,308, 57,311-57,313 (Sept. 18, 2013).
252. Low DSH states are states whose DSH payments total only between 0 and 3%
of their total Medicaid budget.  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(f)(5)(B).
253. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-4(f)(7)(B)(iii) (West 2013); 78 Fed. Reg. 57, 293, 57,294,
57,308-57,309, 57,313 (Sept. 18, 2013).
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on the size of its DSH reduction.254 CMS did note, however, that “hos-
pitals in states implementing the new coverage group that serve Medi-
caid patients may experience a deeper reduction in DSH payments
than they would if all states were to implement the new coverage
group.”255 At the same time, at least one study has found that even in
states that do not expand Medicaid, there will be (or would have been
in the case of DSH funding for 2014 and 2015) a nontrivial decrease in
DSH funds.256
The delay in DSH reductions will potentially allow CMS to substan-
tively alter the methodology, particularly in regard to states’ decisions
on whether to expand Medicaid. While it may be beyond CMS’s author-
ity to expressly consider a state’s decision on expansion, there are alter-
native ways to weight the three factors in the current rule: the
percentage of uninsured people in each state, the extent to which the
state targets DSH payments to hospitals serving high volumes of Medi-
caid patients, and whether states target DSH payments to hospitals with
high levels of uncompensated care. The final rule gives equal weight to
each of these factors.257 The Secretary may wish in the next iteration of
regulations, for example, to provide detailed criteria for allocating DSH
funds to the most active and generous safety net hospitals within each
community, and allow states additional time to target their DSH pay-
ments accordingly in order to maximize their share.  Doing so may help
to maintain at least a certain amount of care for individuals who would
have Medicaid coverage but for the decision of their state to forego the
expansion, despite the correspondingly minimal cost to the state.258
Advocates for the safety net tend to favor rewarding states that make
“good” use of their DSH funds, whether or not the state participates in
the expansion.  The NAPH, for example, recommends that CMS take
special measures to both incentivize states to provide more of their
DSH funds to true safety net hospitals and protect DSH payments to
hospitals with a high rate of uninsured uncompensated costs and/or a
high Medicaid inpatient utilization rate.259
Alternatively, CMS may wish to provide no such consideration to
states that forego the expansion, their hospitals, and their uninsured
254. 78 Fed. Reg. 57,293, 57,295 (Sept. 18, 2013).
255. Id. at 57,294.
256. John A. Graves, Medicaid Expansion Opt-Outs and Uncompensated Care, 367 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2365, 2365–67 (2012).
257. 78 Fed. Reg. 57,294, 57,312 (Sept. 18, 2013).
258. See, e.g., JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,
THE COST AND COVERAGE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION: NATIONAL AND
STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 20, 24 (2012) (finding that, e.g., states in the East South Central
region of the country could reduce their uninsured population by 58.3% with only a 5.8%
average increase in state Medicaid spending), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload/8384.pdf.
259. BRUCE SIEGEL, NAPH, EQUITABLE, SUSTAINABLE, RELIABLE SAFETY NET FINANC-
ING: MEDICAID DSH 3–4 (2012), available at http://www.naph.org/Main-Menu-Category/
Publications/Safety-Net-Financing/May-2012-Medicaid-DSH-Policy-Brief.aspx?FT=.pdf; see
also Dennis P. Andrulis & Nadia J. Siddiqui, Health Reform Holds Both Risks and Rewards for
Safety-Net Providers and Racially and Ethnically Diverse Patients, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1830, 1832
(2011).
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populations. The decision to decline to offer special subsidies for states
that expand their Medicaid programs to a lesser degree than required
under the ACA may be indicative of CMS’s thinking in this regard.260
One might wonder why CMS would be interested in providing more
generous supplemental funding to states that fail to expand Medicaid,
particularly given the troublesome opacity in how such payments are
used and, indeed, to what extent such payments even ultimately remain
in hospitals’ coffers rather than reverting to states.261 For example,
despite improvements in accountability, officials in Texas very recently
stated that DSH funds are retained by the state’s general fund.262
At the same time, some health policy researchers believe that the
reduction in DSH funding and the enhanced reporting for both DSH
and UPL or other supplemental payments provide an opportunity to
increase transparency and accountability for these critical sources of
funding.  As discussed previously, “a general problem with the Medicaid
DSH program is the lack of transparency and accountability for docu-
menting the direct impact of federal spending on care for vulnerable
populations.”263  DSH and UPL payments are generally lump sum pay-
ments unconnected to any specific patient or service and untied to
quality measures, cost-effectiveness, or improvements in patient care.
Therefore researchers have suggested that Medicaid supplemental pay-
ments may “weaken or undermine comprehensive payment reform
efforts and sound purchasing strategies.”264 That is, when supplemental
Medicaid payments are made independent of patients’ experiences and
without tying the payment to the provision of high quality and cost-
effective care, “their use squanders an opportunity” to improve care.265
The Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance
Health System made several recommendations recently to sustain safety
net hospitals financially while promoting high quality care for vulnera-
ble populations.266 Specifically, the Commonwealth Fund Commission
recommended first that enhanced payment through Medicaid should
reflect both a disproportionate number of Medicaid patients “and the
delivery of high-quality, coordinated, and efficient care.”267  It recom-
mended that states target increased Medicaid payments to safety net
260. CMS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON EXCHANGES, MARKET REFORMS AND
MEDICAID 12 (2012), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/
exchanges-faqs-12-10-2012.pdf.
261. See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text.
262. .  Harvey Rice, State Takes Charity Care Money from UTMB., HOUST. CHRONICLE,
Apr. 1, 2013, available at http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/hous-
ton/article/State-takes-charity-care-money-from-UTMB-4398633.php.
263. Aaron McKethan et al., Reforming the Medicaid Disproportionate-Share Hospital Pro-
gram, 28 HEALTH AFF. w926, w927 (2009).
264. Bachrach & Dutton, supra note 244, at 8.
265. Id. at 6–7.
266. The Commonwealth Fund Commission recognized that some safety net hospi-
tals have the ability to cross-subsidize care to low-income patients because their status as
academic medical centers attracts larger numbers of privately insured patients and allows
for higher negotiated rates from commercial payers.  The focus of their report is accord-
ingly on the hospitals that do not have this ability.  Bachrach et al., supra note 240, at 6.
267. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
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hospitals that utilize care delivery models that are the most effective in
coordinating services for vulnerable populations.  This could be
achieved by increasing the rate that hospitals are paid through a trans-
parent and accountable process.268 Finally, in targeting Medicaid DSH
funds, the Commission recommended as a best approach that hospitals
“bill” for each uninsured patient and receive a percentage of the Medi-
caid rate in exchange for these services.  This ensures that payments are
tied to specific patients.269 While the last suggestion promotes trans-
parency rather than improved quality of care, it offers the opportunity
to ultimately tie DSH payments to individual or aggregated outcome
measurements, a step which may ultimately prove worthwhile.
B. What Are the Complexities For Advocates of Medicaid Enrollees and
Charity Patients?
Criticizing Medicaid supplemental payments, even in the service of
reform that seeks to preserve and better target, rather than slash, fund-
ing may be a dangerous game.  Broadly speaking, criticisms of Medi-
caid, even by advocates of improved care for low-income people, can
encourage efforts to dismantle the program.270 There are several con-
stant problems facing advocates of Medicaid enrollees and other low-
income patients who need medical care.  Some of these difficulties were
encountered in Utah when the state decided to implement a § 1115
Medicaid waiver that provided reimbursement for primary health care
services for a limited number of uninsured Utahns, but which
depended upon charity care from physicians and hospitals for specialty
care and paid for the program in part by cutting benefits for certain
Medicaid recipients.  A spokesperson from a Utah nonprofit health
advocacy group stated that there was no opportunity to stop the waiver:
“It became clear to us that this was a train without brakes, and it was
going to happen.”271 A Boston advocacy group concluded concerning
the situation that “opposition is futile and more likely to harm ongoing
working relationships than to produce any concrete benefits.”272
Another subtle source of conflict among advocates was the waiver’s
strategy, whether intentional or unintentional, of pitting current Medi-
caid enrollees’ needs against those of uninsured people.273 Other
national health care advocacy organizations, such as Families USA, were
more vocal about their concerns, stating the waiver would “do consider-
268. Id. at 12.
269. Id. at 20.
270. David E. Rogers et al., Who Needs Medicaid?, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 13, 15
(1982).
271. Mark Taylor, When More Means Less. Utah Gets Federal Approval Limiting Medicaid
Services to Some to Provide a Basic Health Package to 25,000 Low-Income Uninsured, 32 MODERN
HEALTHCARE 6 (2002).
272. MICHAEL MILLER, COMMUNITY CATALYST, WAIVER WATCH ISSUE BRIEF #2: THE
UTAH PRIMARY CARE NETWORK, (2002), available at http://www.communitycatalyst.org/
doc_store/publications/waiver_watch_issue_brief2_the_utah_primary_care_network_
apr02.pdf.
273. Id.
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ably more harm than good for low-income families.”274 Advocates,
then, may have difficulty because of the possibility of unintended harm
arising from necessary criticisms; from the need to maintain working
relationships even when enrollment or services are cut; and from the
way winners and losers are carved out among people with low income.
In the book, Healthy Voices, Unhealthy Silence: Advocacy and Health
Policy for the Poor, Colleen Grogan and Michael Gusmano explore why
advocates may be silent about major issues that are a concern to
them.275  The authors also offer some ways to overcome such silences.
The book studied the actions of the staff members of several nonprofit
organizations in Connecticut during a transition to Medicaid managed
care.  Although the advocates were subject to a situation of political ine-
quality and unequal power, this did not seem to account for all of the
observations of the authors.276 Even under the circumstances, the advo-
cates were not docile concerning several aspects of program details.277
This fact led the authors to consider the practical and theoretical rea-
sons for public silence on certain topics.  The primary concern that the
advocates would not express publicly was whether the services provided
under Medicaid managed care would be “mainstream.”  The use of the
word “mainstream” by advocates meant that they were concerned about
the possibility of “apartheid” care or access to providers that differed
between people enrolled in Medicaid managed care and people
enrolled in commercial managed care plans.278 The assumption among
policymakers that simply enrolling Medicaid patients in managed care
would be equivalent to obtaining care that is “mainstream,” when this
term refers to access to providers and treatments equivalent to that of
commercially insured patients, has not proven valid.279 As one of us
noted in another context, “[T]he concept of ‘mainstreaming’ has
evolved so that it no longer appears to pertain to the locus and nature
of the care provided, but rather to the nature of coverage.”280
The concern of the advocates centered on their realization that
providing care through managed care organizations was not the same
as improving access to a broad range of providers.  In fact, in later inter-
views enrollees “were angry and hurt to find that their access was
restricted to the same Medicaid providers they have always had access
to.”281 Political infeasibility, lack of data, and lack of a solution all con-
tributed to the silence of the Connecticut advocates.282 Many of the
organizations were also “resource dependent” on the agencies where
274. Id. at 8.
275. GROGAN & GUSMANO, supra note 122.
276. Id. at 98.
277. Id. at 98–102.
278. Id. at 4.
279. Colleen M. Grogan, The Medicaid Managed Care Policy Consensus for Welfare Recip-
ients: A Reflection of Traditional Welfare Concerns, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 815, 837
(1997).
280. Laura D. Hermer, Medicaid, Low-Income Pools, and the Goals of Privatization, 17
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 405, 421 (2010).
281. Grogan, supra note 279, at 837.
282. GROGAN & GUSMANO, supra note 122, at 124.
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their advocacy efforts would need to be addressed, leading to both per-
ceived and actual conflicts of interest.283 The small number of people
and groups involved and the close ties among these people also some-
times made deliberation more difficult.284 Despite—and in part
because of—these challenges, the authors conclude that the process of
public deliberation can lead to greater understanding among partici-
pants and improvements in policy outcomes.285
Grogan and Gusmano note that only about 1% of the organiza-
tions attempting to influence policy in Washington claim to represent
the poor.286 In general, providers tend to be more interested in reim-
bursement rates as compared to enrollees or potential enrollees who
may be relatively more interested in eligibility.287 Often, safety net prov-
iders are assumed to represent the interests of poor or other vulnerable
people.  Yet these providers have a clear conflict of interest in many
circumstances.288 For example, there is no legal requirement that DSH
funds must be used for any specific purpose and this may be one reason
that the funds have not consistently been shown to lead to greater pro-
vision of uncompensated care.289 Institutional safety net providers have
a financial incentive to capture the Medicaid population in part
because of the supplemental funds.  Thus the providers’ interests may
not be aligned with the best interests of the Medicaid population.290
When cutbacks in care for vulnerable people are made, most often,
safety net hospitals claim that whatever was undertaken “had” to be
done: “[S]afety net administrators respond by pointing out that if they
do not take these steps, their basic viability will be threatened, resulting
essentially in no care for anybody.”291 This reasoning can be problem-
atic because it is rarely the case that only one certain set of actions must
be undertaken or even that institutional financial problems are prima-
rily attributable to one cause.  There is also the problem that the people
most affected by policy decisions are rarely, if ever, actively involved,
and even advocates, as mentioned above, may not be effective when
their own survival, whether political or economic, is at stake.  Some of
the more recent publications on health care reform seem to better rec-
ognize these potential conflicts, an important first step in ameliorating
them.292
283. Id. at 6–7. See also Colleen M. Grogan & Michael K. Gusmano, Political Strategies
of Safety-Net Providers in Response to Medicaid Managed Care Reforms, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 5 (2009).
284. GROGAN & GUSMANO, supra note 122, at 126.
285. Id. at 130.
286. Id. at 125.
287. Karl Kronebusch, Medicaid and the Politics of Groups: Recipients, Providers, and
Policy Making, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 839, 862 (1997).
288. Gloria J. Bazzoli et al., The Influence of Health Policy and Market Factors on the
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IV. CONCLUSION
The importance of Medicaid in the provision of medical care for
many Americans, some of whom are the most vulnerable among us,
cannot be overstated.  At the same time, Medicaid has not provided
health coverage on the basis of impoverishment alone or on the basis of
any consistent measure of vulnerability or need—even though the ACA
initially held out the promise of finally covering most people with the
lowest income. Inconsistency, whim, and discretion have pervaded all
aspects of the program and have kept the program firmly rooted in a
nineteenth century conception of charity.
Medicaid supplemental funding mirrors much of this inconsistency
and whim, though the reasons for the inconsistency may differ.
Whatever their actual benefits to vulnerable Medicaid and uninsured
populations and to the safety net hospitals who shoulder the largest
load in treating them, DSH and UPL represent insufficiently consid-
ered solutions to gaps in the funding and delivery of health care for
low-income Americans who lack private coverage.  Congress, rather
than addressing the vast disparities in care between the privately
insured on the one hand and Medicaid enrollees and the uninsured on
the other, instead chose an opaque and oblique partial solution that
allowed enterprising states to funnel funds to hospitals that could point
to uncompensated care on a balance sheet, if not to a person who
received needed care.
Perhaps most disturbing is that much of the substantial amount of
funding through the Medicaid program that does potentially cover the
cost of uncompensated care has for years simply disappeared like a glass
of water poured onto the desert sand.  And wherever the money goes, it
is tallied to the poor’s social account.  It may be that this non-traceable
funding was viewed as necessary initially given the backlash against pub-
lic programs associated with “dependence.”  The fact remains that the
entities with the most power have gained from these payments with lit-
tle ability to assess the benefits to the people behind the uncompen-
sated care numbers.  The process has been deeply enmeshed in the
political complexities of federal and state relationships.  As such, Medi-
caid program details and funding for uncompensated care have been
subject to a largely unintentional mercilessness, a byproduct of power
struggles.
Yet there are many reasons to expect changes for the better in the
future.  The Medicaid program continues to have the broad base and
flexibility to expand under the ACA and recalcitrant states may ulti-
mately find the enticement of federal funds too attractive to reject.
After decades of struggles back and forth, supplemental payments are
on a trajectory toward much greater transparency and accountability.
History shows that declaring Medicaid to be a program not linked to
welfare or tainted with charity was not enough to change the program’s
image.  Yet many improvements related to processes of enrollment and
coordination of care that are currently available could be used to make
Medicaid “mainstream” in the sense that counts for enrollees.  Still
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 109 Side B      05/07/2014   15:37:06
34929-nde_28-1 Sheet No. 109 Side B      05/07/2014   15:37:06
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-1\NDE105.txt unknown Seq: 44  1-MAY-14 14:53
208 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28
there are many uncertainties, not the least of which is how to enhance
the public voice of the people who are enrolled in Medicaid or who
may need charity.  As the ACA is implemented at both the federal and
state levels, we should be cognizant of these issues.
